From beginning to end, Bitcoin systems exist in both the prisoner's dilemma.
In fact, it is almost all digital currency POW mechanisms are problems.
Prisoner's Dilemma (prisoner's dilemma) refers to a special game between the two arrested prisoner.
Prisoner's Dilemma means: two suspects caught by the police after committing the crime, were kept in a different room to stand trial. The police know the two men guilty, but the lack of sufficient evidence. The police then told the two men:
If both deny each sentenced to one year;
If both confess, each sentenced to eight years;
If two people in a frank and another denial, frankly put out, sentenced to ten years of denial.
Thus, each prisoner are faced with two choices: confess or deny.
In the case where two separate trial, obviously can not know the other party is to choose confess or deny, but the moment for their own best choices are frank.
Because if associates deny it, can be acquitted themselves confess, deny sentenced to a year, so frankly better than deny; if accomplices confess, then he confessed sentenced to eight years, to deny sentenced to ten years, and frankly still better than not confess.
As a result, two suspects have chosen to confess, each sentenced to eight years.
For two criminals composed of "team", the best choice for the whole team without a doubt is both deny each sentenced to one year. But the reality shows just the opposite.
The prisoner's dilemma reflects the problem is that everyone on the team for their optimal choice, not necessarily the optimal choice of the entire team, individual rational choice can sometimes lead to irrational choice team.
This is the Prisoner's Dilemma. That's why I say Bitcoin system will have such a prisoner's dilemma it?
According to the algorithm set bits currency, the system will automatically adjust credits bit difficult, so that the block has been stabilized at about 10 minutes. In other words, no matter how many nodes Bitcoin, how high the whole network operators force, Bitcoin block out time is 10 minutes.
And a new Bitcoin block reward is issued to the node successfully bookkeeping. Since the birth of the mine pool model, to be fair, ore mining machine operator pool will force all access to the mine pool to integrate compete billing, to improve the success rate, but bitcoin reward after a successful accounting in accordance with the mine pool access mining machine operator power accounted for distribution.
For example, assuming now access a mineral mining machine pool 100 is finally force, wherein the force of a mining machine operator is 1, the current block is 100 bits bonus credits, then this force mining machine operator 1 You will be able to share a bit currency.
当前几乎所有矿工都是采用的这种接入矿池进行挖矿，而后根据算力分配收益的挖矿方式。
于是，矿工接入矿池的算力越高，就能获得越多的奖励。所以矿机市场越来越大，生产矿机的企业也越来越多。但就是这中间，产生了囚徒困境。
首先，为了能获得更多的挖矿奖励，矿工会选择在自己承受范围之内尽量提高算力，也就是购买新矿机，这是“矿工”这个角色在“矿工团队”中的个人最佳选择。矿机生产商也会为了迎合客户需求，不断加大技术研发投入，生产高算力低能耗的新一代矿机。
整体来看，整个“矿工团队”的整体算力越来越高，但比特币的出块速度仍然是维持在10分钟一块，也就是可以看做是整体比特币奖励没有变化（实际情况是每大约四年，比特币出块奖励就会减半一次）。
如果用公式来表示每个矿工在每一个新区块诞生时分得的新生币奖励：
矿工获得的新生币奖励＝（这名矿工的算力÷全网算力）×区块奖励
假设现在全网矿工每一个人都把自己的矿机关掉一半，用公式可以表示成：
矿工获得的新生币奖励＝[（这名矿工的算力÷2）÷（全网算力÷2）]×区块奖励
可以发现，即使每一名矿工的算力都减半，他们获得的新生币奖励也不会发生变化，因为他们的算力占全网算力的比率没有发生变化。
也就是说，“矿工团队”的集体最佳选择，应该是各自按比例减少矿机成本的投入，这样获币成本将大大降低，同时获币数量又能保持不变。
但我们知道，这是不可能发生的事情。如果全网矿工答应将自己的算力都减半，如果出现一个“叛徒”斥巨资加大算力投入的话，那原先的分红比例就会被完全打破，甚至这名“叛徒”还可以以原先少的多的成本就可以对比特币系统发动51%攻击。
这显然是谁都不想看到的情况。于是矿工们还是选择不断地加大对矿机的投入。
这就是我说的比特币系统中的囚徒困境。矿工们正在“被迫”选择自己个人的最佳选择，而这个选择恰恰是“矿工团队”的最差选择。
我们现在还无法知晓比特币的创始人中本聪是事先设置好了这样的囚徒困境让矿工跳进去，还是无意中创造出了目前世界上最大的囚徒困境。但毫无疑问的是，长期来看，比特币系统中的囚徒困境正在不断使得比特币全网算力越来越高，系统安全性也正在因为全网算力的提高越来越强。单从囚徒困境达成的效果来看，这应该是比特币的创始人中本聪乐意看到的现象。
囚徒困境在比特币系统中的影响还在于利用巴普洛夫定律给矿工制造出了一种心理暗示
不管有多少的矿工能意识到比特币系统中的囚徒困境，他们也都会选择不断地加大算力投入以获得更多的比特币奖励，不会有矿工会主动提出发起降低全网算力的活动，因为只要有一个人不这么做，那么对于其他所有人来说都会是不划算的一笔生意。
久而久之，矿工们就会形成一种条件反射：只有加大算力投入才能获得更多的比特币奖励。并且不会再有人去研究怎么解决这种囚徒困境，因为根本没办法解决。
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