This article explores whether the new technology of Web3 can solve the contradictory problems of the world and bring more opportunities for the future prosperity of human civilization.
Today, nine countries are presumed to possess nuclear weapons; many more have the capability to manufacture other classes of weapons of mass destruction (wmd - biological, chemical and radiological weapons). This existential threat—along with the innate human drive to innovate, combined with the perverse incentive structures associated with the arms industry—means that we are competing for ever more threatening capabilities. Many more states are seriously developing the ability to produce nuclear weapons within their territories, and concerns abound that non-state actors will somehow acquire such weapons.
As weapons technology develops, power asymmetries intensify, and few, if any, individuals have the power to end millions of lives and destroy vast swathes of public and private property. But just as technological development presents risks, it also presents opportunities. Here are three ways in which consensus networks and decentralized network technologies provide impartial and reliable mechanisms for controlling the distribution, operation, and deployment of weapons in the 21st century.
Protecting Sensitive Arms Supply Chains
Blockchain is often touted as a way to significantly improve the efficiency of global supply chains, which consist of a large number of private and public actors that coordinate the movement of goods across multiple jurisdictions from their point of origin to their country of consumption. The ecosystem is suitable for blockchain because of its reliance on intermediaries, the participation of independent entities subject to different regulatory requirements (i.e. national customs rules), and its global nature. Establishing transparent and rigorous global transport and logistics protocols can make this process smoother, reduce costs and increase integrity.
In the arms supply chain, the term "expendable" belies an ominous truth: expending weapons usually means deploying them, detonating them or firing them at some target with the intent to damage or kill them. International law generally holds that it is just and legal for sovereign states to deploy such munitions in the context of conflict, which explains the continuing figures for the continued production of light and heavy weapons (SIPRI) - although some question whether legal weapons are being deployed illegally, such as the Saudi coalition In Yemen's civil war (UN News 2018).
Perhaps more relevant is the case where legally produced and transported weapons are diverted in transit to some illicit actor, usually a terrorist or other non-state militarized group, such as an organized criminal network. Violating a weapon's "end-user certificate" is illegal (Bromley and Griffiths, 2010), but often provides monetary or ideological incentives to intermediary (or even end-user) custodians of the weapon to explain their decision to violate the certificate.
It is now possible to create a networked system of secure shipping containers, linked to smart contracts, to track the location and safety of weapons and dual-use cargo in a global logistics network. This regime would provide an additional technical mechanism to ensure compliance with end-use certificates, export control regimes and any other control schemes designed to ensure the safe transport of hazardous materials to the intended recipient country.
As an example, imagine a locked automatic rifle or centrifuge capable of enriching uranium, fitted with sensors and connected to the internet. A physical lock can only be opened "legally" (in an objective sense - upon receipt of a signal from a smart contract) when delivered to a pre-approved end user, that is, once the case reaches its authorized destination and the smart contract receives Digital signature of the authorized recipient.
If the integrity of a case is compromised during transit, a notification can be sent to the network and relevant authorities notified within minutes, along with information about who is the current legal guardian of the artifact, its location history, and more. This system may include some kind of kill switch (forced transfer of authority), which means that the interruption of the data link will constitute a breach of integrity, just like forced physical entry. The system could be used commercially or even to provide a system for overseeing arms transfers in security or military logistics networks. As long as keys are managed properly (i.e., malicious agents cannot extract private keys and thus sign transactions that appear to come from connected sensors), the system can provide an additional layer of security for weapons supply chains—indeed, supply chains for any controlled material .
Extending this to a secure enclave, secure multi-party computation geometry (Atallah and Du 2001) can enable privacy-preserving systems to detect false participants without revealing the strategic location data of compliant players.
Imagine that there is a treaty that dictates where certain weapons can be deployed. Signatories—confrontational militaries—could submit encrypted location data on the location of all their weapons; within a secure enclave, those positions could be verified to comply with the terms of the treaty without revealing strategic secrets to any human actor. Only in the event of a breach of the treaty is misconduct revealed and agreed penalties imposed.
Management of autonomous weapon systems
Technological developments in drones, land and sea vehicles have inevitably led to the weaponization of these vehicles. These machines typically rely on consistent data links with human operators, but increasingly use onboard software for navigation and decision-making. Arguments that such onboard algorithms might be granted the ability to decide whether to engage a target -- to kill someone or destroy something -- have ranged from calling for a complete ban to claiming that existing laws governing warfare will be sufficient to cover emerging and unforeseen Combat Technology (Economist 2019).
Acknowledging the impossibility of enforcing compliance by motivated actors intent on waging war, I still wonder: Could consensus networks and other decentralized technologies provide some way to ensure that autonomous weapon systems are governed by mutually agreed upon rules?
The concept here relies on specifications defined by participating militaries, perhaps contributed by the public, that define acceptable engagement conditions for autonomous weapon systems. The Consensus Network will enable the developer community to maintain and update the current approved compiler (which can be used as the core program of self-driving cars). This solution also requires reliable hardware: After the vehicles start, they need to confirm to the network that they are running the current unmodified version of the software. This would give the controllers of the system (an entirely different conversation - perhaps experts and developers from cooperating militaries) a way to know that all the autonomous weapons they deploy are running on the proper software. Self-driving cars are programmed in such a way that they cannot operate with old, unsafe, unapproved software.
The system has implications for networks of all autonomous vehicles (cars, ships, etc.), but has particular significance for those capable of deploying weapons. Amoral adversaries, as it is acknowledged, would need strong incentives to comply with such a system; perhaps, making the deployment of autonomous weapons that do not participate in the system a war crime, or lead to the imposition of economic sanctions. would be a start, and other incentive schemes should be explored, as the system will depend on the proportion of participation in autonomous weapons.
Responsibility for deploying weapons of mass destruction
On the spectrum of destructive capabilities, some weapons stand out in terms of their ability to deal damage. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons – collectively referred to as “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) – are subject to international law, while other conventional weapons are not. Much effort is devoted to ensuring that non-nuclear-weapon states do not develop the capability to produce them (UN Security Council Resolution 1540), and the control and management of such weapons is one of the most important responsibilities of states possessing these weapons.
Innovations brought about by developments in information technology may provide better ways to manage the storage, maintenance, and most importantly, deployment of WMD. Here we focus on perhaps the simplest application of distributed ledger technology to manage the deployment of these weapons: the use of multi-signature smart contracts to trigger launches.
This would require a privacy-preserving blockchain as part of a nuclear-capable government digital infrastructure, coupled with a trusted computing environment installed on weapons and launch systems. Such a system—with nodes maintained by different branches or departments of government, possibly even allied governments or non-aligned third parties—could provide an immutable and highly reliable software system in which highly sensitive launch Commands can be programmed to rely on input from a few top decision makers. This could extend to relying on signatures from people other than sovereign governments, and perhaps the consent of allied militaries. If target coordinates are included in the smart contract call, further conditions can be programmed based on the target area. It is conceivable that it would be objectively impossible (depending on the reliability of trusted hardware) to launch a chained nuclear missile into an ally's territory, if such a system were properly installed and configured. Of course, it's worth saying that this is just a stopgap measure to complete denuclearization - maybe that's a topic for another article.
Extending the concept of smart contracts for critical government and military digital infrastructure, certain executive powers can be enabled, for example, only if an electoral body declares war - funds can be released, launch conditions can be changed (e.g., enabling fewer policy makers respond to threats), etc.
at last
The important question here is: How does the new decentralized paradigm provide opportunities for innovation in how we manage our most pernicious and powerful capabilities? Could this technology provide an additional layer of security against unjustified errors or upgrades? How can it be used to stay ahead of the trend towards increasingly automated kill decisions? We created computers to help us - how can they help us avoid the worst human errors? deploy in context, but brainstorming today will become a sound solution tomorrow.