backward reasoning
In practice, a 50:50 compromise is also the result of backward reasoning
example:
Five pirates grab 100 gold coins, and the rules for dividing the spoils:
(1) Draw lots to determine each person's number [1, 2, 3.4.5].
(2) The distribution plan is proposed by No. 1, 5 people vote, and more than half of them agree to pass. Otherwise he will be thrown into the sea to feed the sharks.
(3) After No. 1 dies, No. 2 proposes a plan, and 4 people vote. The plan is passed if and only if more than half of them agree, otherwise No. 2 will also be thrown into the sea.
(4) and so on, until a solution is found that everyone accepts. If there is only No. 5 left, of course he accepts the result of one person swallowing.
Assume that every robber is rational. If you were the first robber, how would you come up with a distribution plan that would maximize your profits? This is
a complicated question. For the convenience of description, we publish the answer first, and then do the analysis.
The first impression of the allocation rules is: if you draw No. 1. That would be unfortunate. Because as the first person to propose a plan. The chances of surviving are slim. Even if he doesn't want a cent and gives all the money to the other 4 people, those people may not agree with his distribution plan, then he has no choice but to die. If you think the same way, the answer will be quite unexpected: the result is [97, 0, 1, 2, 0] or [97, 0, l, 0, 2].
Let's analyze from the perspective of these four people: No. 5 is the least cooperative, because he is not at risk of being thrown into the sea. Intuitively. For every potential opponent thrown down, there is one less potential opponent; No. 4 is the opposite, his chances of survival depend entirely on who is alive in front of him, so it is worth fighting for: No. 3 does not care about the fate of the first two at all, he only needs the support of No. 4 That's it; No. 2 needs 3 votes to live, so, you... have the right idea, but it's too general. Therefore, their decisions should be extrapolated in accordance with strict logical thinking.
Where to start? Earlier we mentioned "looking forward and reasoning backward". The reasoning process should be from the back to the front, because the more backward the strategy is, the easier it is to see. No. 5's strategy is the simplest: he wants to feed everyone in to the sharks (but that doesn't mean he has to vote against everyone. He also has to take into account how everyone else's plan goes through). Look at No. 4: If all the robbers from No. 1 to No. 3 feed the sharks, only No. 4 and No. 5 are left. No. 5 must vote against letting No. 4 feed the sharks. To swallow all the gold coins. so. No. 4 can survive only by supporting No. 3. Knowing this, No. 3 proposes an allocation plan of f100, 0, 0]. For No. 4 and No. 5, he took all the gold coins for himself, because he knew that No. 4 had nothing and would still vote in favor. Plus one vote for his plan to pass. but. No. 2 infers No. 3's plan. Will propose [98, 0, l, 1] program, that is to give up No. 3. And give 4 and 5 1 gold coin each. Since the plan is more beneficial to the 4th and 5th than when the 3rd is allocated, it can get their support. In this way, No. 2 will take 98 gold coins. However, No. 2's plan will be seen by No. 1, and No. 1 will propose [97, 0.1, 2, 0] or [97, O, 1, 0, 2], that is, give up No. 2, and Give No. 3 l gold coins. Give No. 4 or No. 5 2 coins at the same time. Since this plan of No. 1 is better for No. 3 and No. 4 or No. 5 than when No. 2 is allocated, they get their votes in favor. Plus No. 1 own ticket. No. 1 plan can be approved. 97 gold coins can easily fall into one's pocket. This is undoubtedly the plan that No. 1 can get the most profit!
Backtracking is an effective tool to analyze dynamic games under complete information, but it is not a complete information game in reality.
Divide the cake game
Different from the cockfighting game, both parties will benefit from their actions. The key to the game is the distribution of the income. When the size of the cake does not change with time, after the strength is compared, the corresponding cake share is selected according to the strength.
When the pie shrinks over time, the negotiation itself has a cost
example:
Suppose there is an ice cream cake on the table, and the two children are haggling about
the distribution. The cake keeps melting. We assume that for every suggestion or counter suggestion, the cake
shrinks by the same amount in the direction of zero.
Negotiations dragged on because the two sides did not agree on the extent to which the pie would shrink (benefit escaping)
在博弈中,决定大饼切分方式的一个重要因素是各方的等待成本。虽然双方可能失去同样多的利益,一方却可能有别的替代方法,减少损失。因此,要减少己方的等待成本
保护讨价还价的能力
一天深夜，两名美国经济学家在会议结束之后，要返回酒店。他们在耶路撒冷街头找了一辆有牌照的出租车，告诉司机应该怎么去他们的酒店。司机几乎立即认出他们是美国客人，因此拒绝打表，并许诺会给他们一个低于打表数目的更好的价钱。自然．两人对这样的许诺颇有点将信将疑。
在他们表示愿意按照打表数目付钱的前提下．这个陌生的司机为什么还要提出这么一个奇怪的少收一点的许诺呢，他们怎么才能知道自己有没有多付车钱呢'另一方面，此前他们除了答应按照打表数目付钱之外，并没有许诺再向司机支付其他报酬。假如他们打算跟司机讨价还价，而这场谈判叉破裂了，那么他们就得另找一辆出租汽车。他们的思路是．一旦他们到达酒店，他们的讨价还价地位将会大大改善。何况，此时此刻再找一辆出租车实在很不容易。
于是他们坐车出发，顺利到达酒店。司机要求他们支付以色列币2500谢克尔(相当于2 75美元)。因为在以色列讨价还价非常普遍，所以美国人还价2200谢克尔。司机生气了，不等对方说话就锁死r全部车门，按照原路段命地开车往回走。司机开车回到出发点．非常粗暴地把他们扔出车外．一边大叫：“现在你们自己去看看你们那2200谢克尔能走多远吧!”
他们又找了一辆出租车。这名司机开始打表，跳到2200谢克尔的时候，他们也回到了酒店。
毫无疑问，花这么多时间折腾，对于两位经济学家来说还值不到300谢克尔。但是这个故事的价值却不容忽视．因为它说明一旦面对一个不懂得讨价还价的对手，可能会出现什么样的危验。在自尊和理性这两样东西之间，我们必须学会权衡。假如总共只不过要多花20美分，更明智的选择可能是到达目的地之后乖乖付钱。
这个故事还有第二个教训。设想一下，假如两个美国人是在下车之后再来讨论价钱问题，他们的讨价还价地位该有多大的改善。 如果是租一辆出租车．思路应该与此完全相反。假如你在上车之前告诉司机你要到哪里去．那么你很有可能眼雹巴看着出租车弃你而去，另找更好的主顾。记住，你最好先上车，然后告诉司机你要到哪里去。 这个故事还提示我们．必须学会通过改变我们与对手之间的位置，刨造一个对自己最佳的讨价还价的地位。
路径依赖
我们选择QWER键盘的经历,迫使我们不得不继续使用这种较差的技术。通过博弈论可知,行为习惯有很重的影响,解决这类问题的办法是借助一场短期而严厉的运动
超速均衡
ess策略:即进化稳定策略,指凡是种群大部分成员采用的策略,而且这种策略比别的策略好,那么就是ess策略。因此,对于个体来说,最好的策略取决于种群中大多数成员在干什么。所以从众效应是有一定道理的。
运用这种从众规律,可以解决一些问题。
例子:
随着楚国实力的增强。与中原各国的冲突也日益增多。对于战车的需求也相应增加。但是楚国民俗习坐矮车，民间的牛车底座程低，不适于在战时用做马车。楚王准备下令全国提高车的底座。孙叔敖说：“下令太多，民不知所从，这不好。如果您想把车底座改高，我请求让各个地方的城镇把街巷两头的门限升高。乘车的人都是有身份的君子，他们不能为过门槛频繁下车，自然就会把车的底座造高了。”
楚王听从了．没有发布政令，而是由官府机构统一放弃矮车．改乘高车，同时将城镇街巷两头设较高的门限,这样过了不到三个月．全国的牛车底座都升高了。
看到这里，我们已经能够理解孙叔敖在抬高城门槛的行动中所运用的智慧了。在他的方法中，提高门槛的高度．相当于对底座较低的矮车进行的一种惩罚，而为高车提供的一种便利。最开始的时候，使用矮车的“君子们”受到种种限制．产生种种不便，无法顺利通过街巷的门限。而与此同时，官府所使用的高车又给了他们一个示范的效应。为了得到这种通行便利．改造自己的车辆底座也就理所当然地成为一种优势策略。 孙叔赦的做法对我们的启示在于，一个短暂而立竿见影的执法过程，其效率不仅远远胜过无法触动现行习惯的任何行政命令，而且大大高于一个投人同样力量进行的一个长期而温和的执法过程。
只要花较小的力气,对问题中的关键部分加以引导和控制,就能扩散至全局
共同知识:对一个事件来说，如果所有博奔当事人对该事件都有了解，并且所有当
事人都知道其他当事人也知道这一事件，并且所有当事人都知道所有当事人
都知道这一事件，那么该事件就是共同知识。
当一个知识变成共同知识的时候,决策过程就相应的变化了,原有的封闭的信息变成了公共的信息,于是我们就推理,我知道他知道我知道……
不确定性可分为两大类：主观不确定性和客观不确定性。
主观不确定性是指决策者由于有关资料的缺乏而不能对事物的态度做出正确的判断，而这种判断却是其他掌握资料的人可以有的。和主观不确定性相关的信息常常具有不对称性。对个人来说．拥有信息越多，越有可能做出正确决策。对社会来说，信息越透明．越有助于降低人们的交易成本，提高社会效率。
客观不确定性是指事物状态的客观属性本身具有不确定性。对此。人们
可以通过认识去把握客观规律。但是，认识本身并不能消除这种不确定性。
解决信息不对称问题
当信息不对称时,就容易出现劣币驱逐良币的现象,要减少逆向选择．就必须解决信息不对称问题。解决思路是委托人或“高质量”代理人通过信息决策，减少委托人与代理人之间信息不对称的程度。解决的途径有两个：其一是委托人通过制定一套策略或合同来获取代理人的信息不对称信息,这就是“信息甄别”；其二是“高质量”代理人利用信息优势向委托人传播自己的私人信息，这就是“信息传递”。 同样的道理．一个好的政治制度，必须设计出分离均衡，使那些说真话不偷懒的官和不说真话并且偷懒的官都有所选择，把比较差的官筛选出去。这也是一个行政制度具有效率的必要条件。一个制度要有好的效率．必须让那些具有信息优势的人来监督官员。谁具有信息优势呢，当然是那些本地的居民。
斯宾塞指出：“在二手车市场张,如果高质量旧汽车的卖家能够找出一种方式，使得付出的成本低于低质量产品卖家付出的成本，那么。作为一种高质量的信息传递，将能够从市场活动获得足够的补偿而获益。”因此，对高质量旧车的卖家来说，只要某种发送信号方式的边际成本较低。市场将会出现某种均衡。信息传递本身是有成本的,只有具有一定实力的产品,才能负担起这种成本,因此,这种行为本身就屏蔽了一部分劣质商家。 如果发送信息的成本对所有人都一样,那就没有用了。
因此信息传递模型的关键:
1.信息传递是有成本的
2.要让不同的人发送同一个信息的成本是不同的
分离均衡的筛子
分离均衡研究的是拥有信息的一方主动发布信息，从不同类中分离出来，这样才有利可图。
分离均衡与信号传递不同之处：信号传递研究的是拥有不同信息的人如何通过信号传递，来把自己与同类分离出来。分离均衡是说明不拥有信息的人如何设计一个机制，来进行信息甄别，使具有不同信息的人不隐瞒信息和行为，进而提高市场效率。
信息传递的几个原则
第一．如果体有几个坏消息要宣布，应该把几个坏消息同时公布于人。把几个坏消息结合起来，它们所引起的边际效用递减会使各个坏消息加总起来的总效用最小。人们常常讨厌雪上加霜、火上浇油的做法，可是真正让人们选择去经受两次伤害还是经受一次大的伤害，在能够承受的限度内，对于很多人来说还是快刀斩乱麻来得更加爽快一些。
第二．如果你有几个好消息要公布，应该把几个好消息分开公布。你把这两个好消息分两天告诉别人会让开心两次。因为分两次听到两个好消息等于经历了两次快乐，这两次快乐的总和要比一次性享受两个好消息带来的快乐更大。双喜临门固然非常令人高兴，可是天天有喜也许能够带来更多的欢笑。
第三，如果你有一个大大的好消息和一个小小的坏消息，应该把这两个消息一起告诉别人。这样的话．小小的坏消息带来的痛苦会教大大的好消息带来的快乐冲淡，负面效应也就小得多。比如你被叫到上司的办公室，被告知说因为工作表现突出，每个月被加薪150元。但是不巧的是，你在挤公车的时候不小心丢了[00元钱，那么你回家该把这两个消息一起告诉你的家人。虽然丢了100元钱，但比起加薪这个喜讯也算不了什么．你的家人一定不会在意那丢失的100元钱的。
第四．如果有一个大大的坏消息和一个小小的好消息，应该分别公布这两条消息。这样的话，小小的好消息带来的快乐不至于被大大的坏消息带来的痛苦所淹没．人们还是可以享受好消息带来的快乐。举例来说．现在股市不景气，你买的股票今天股价暴跌，使你损失10万元。不过，你的运气还算不错．在超市购物时中了一盒价值50元的巧克力。你应当将这两个消息分两天带回家，尽管爱人得知股票亏损的消息会很沮丧，说不定还会怪你没有投资眼光，不过这并不妨碍她第二天品尝巧克力的甜美。但是，如果你一次性把两条消息同时告诉他的话．说不定她吃起巧克力来感觉味道也是苦的。
决不妥协的策略
夏侯懋镇守濮阳。吕布派将领假装来降，乘机却劫持了夏侯懋，来索取财宝。韩浩独自带军队屯在营门外．要求众将按兵不动，各个军营安定了下来。韩浩便进人夏侯懋所在之处，斥责劫持人质的人说：“你们凶残顽劣，竟然敢劫持我们的大将军，你们还想活命吗我接受了命令来讨伐贼人，难道能因为一个将军被劫持就放纵你们胡作非为吗?”接着他又哭着对夏侯懋说：“事关国法，我有什么办法呢?”说罢，他迅速召集军队攻打劫持者。劫持者惶恐惊惧，磕头求饶．韩浩马上把他们全捉了起来。
曹操十分赞赏韩浩的行为。发令：从今以后，再遇到劫持人质的人，就一定要全力攻打他们，不要顾忌被劫持的人质。从此以后，劫持人质的事情就再也没有发生过。
曹操之所以表扬韩浩，是因为他明白，只有采取绝不妥协的态度，才能够最大限度地阻吓有意劫持者，打消他们通过劫持人质来索取赎金的念头。只有这个绝不谈判的威胁是可信的，那么，劫持者才会意识到他们的行动注定徒劳无功。
但是其中的风险也考验着韩浩和曹操。每一次．只要遭遇劫持事件，一旦这个威胁必须实践，拒绝妥协的态度可能使被劫持者命丧黄泉。但这种风险也恰恰是区别一个有战略眼光的领抽和一个短视者的试金石。只有前者才明白，屈服一次绝不仅是满足一批劫持者的要求那么简单，还会诱发更多的劫持。
事实上，这一思维方式是很多决策者的共识。
制度设计中的折衷
比如，在推出一本新书时，通过提供精装本和平装本两种版本，出版商可以将读者分为两大类：一类对书的评价较高，另一类对书的评价较低。在提供电信服务时，服务商可以对手机用户提供两种收费标准：一种是单位时间通话费用较低，但需交纳一定的月租费；另一种是单位时间通话费用较高．但不需交纳月租费。根据用户的不同选择，服务商可以将用户区分为高频率用户和低频率用户两类。
亨特先生被派到美国新兵培训中心推广军人保验。听他演讲的新兵100％都自愿购买了保险，从来没人能达到这么高的成功率。培训主任很想知道他的推销之道，于是悄悄来到课室，听他对新兵讲些什么。
“小伙子们，我要向你们解释军人保险带来的保障。”亨特说，“假如发生了战争，你不幸阵亡了政府将会给你的家属赔偿20万美元；但如果你没有买保险．政府只会支付6000美元的抚恤金…·”这时．下面有一个新兵沮丧地说：“这有什么用，多少钱都换不回我的命。”听到这里．亨特不慌不忙地说：“你错了，想想看，一旦发生了战争，政府会先派挪一种士兵上战场’买了保险的还是没买保险的?”
边缘政策
为了避免与对手同归于尽,人们一定希望找到一个刚好足够阻吓对手而又不会过火的回应方法,这种方法就是使威胁变得缓和一些,创造一种风险,而不是一种确定性。边缘政策将皮球踢给对方,让对方知难而退。
Backward reasoning In practice, a 50:50 compromise is also the result of backward reasoning Example: Five pirates grab 100 gold coins, and the rules for dividing the spoils:(1) Draw lots to determine each person's number [1, 2, 3.4 .5].
(2) The distribution plan is proposed by No. 1, 5 people vote, and more than half of them agree to pass. Otherwise he will be thrown into the sea to feed the sharks.
(3) After No. 1 dies, No. 2 proposes a plan, and 4 people vote. The plan is passed if and only if more than half of them agree, otherwise No. 2 will also be thrown into the sea.
(4) and so on, until a solution is found that everyone accepts. If there is only No. 5 left, of course he accepts the result of one person swallowing.
Assume that every robber is rational. If you were the first robber, how would you come up with a distribution plan that would maximize your profits? This is
a complicated question. For the convenience of description, we publish the answer first, and then do the analysis. The first impression of the allocation rules is: if you draw No. 1. That would be unfortunate. Because as the first person to propose a plan. The chances of surviving are slim. Even if he doesn't want a cent and gives all the money to the other 4 people, those people may not agree with his distribution plan, then he has no choice but to die. If you think the same way, the answer will be quite unexpected: the result is [97, 0, 1, 2, 0] or [97, 0, l, 0, 2].
Let's analyze from the perspective of these four people: No. 5 is the least cooperative, because he is not at risk of being thrown into the sea. Intuitively. For every potential opponent thrown down, there is one less potential opponent; No. 4 is the opposite, his chances of survival depend entirely on who is alive in front of him, so it is worth fighting for: No. 3 does not care about the fate of the first two at all, he only needs the support of No. 4 That's it; No. 2 needs 3 votes to live, so, you... have the right idea, but it's too general. Therefore, their decisions should be extrapolated in accordance with strict logical thinking.
Where to start? Earlier we mentioned "looking forward and reasoning backward". The reasoning process should be from the back to the front, because the more backward the strategy is, the easier it is to see. No. 5's strategy is the simplest: he wants to feed everyone in to the sharks (but that doesn't mean he has to vote against everyone. He also has to take into account how everyone else's plan goes through). Look at No. 4: If all the robbers from No. 1 to No. 3 feed the sharks, only No. 4 and No. 5 are left. No. 5 must vote against letting No. 4 feed the sharks. To swallow all the gold coins. so. No. 4 can survive only by supporting No. 3. Knowing this, No. 3 proposes an allocation plan of f100, 0, 0]. For No. 4 and No. 5, he took all the gold coins for himself, because he knew that No. 4 had nothing and would still vote in favor. Plus one vote for his plan to pass. but. No. 2 infers No. 3's plan. Will propose [98, 0, l, 1] program, that is to give up No. 3. And give 4 and 5 1 gold coin each. Since the plan is more beneficial to the 4th and 5th than when the 3rd is allocated, it can get their support. In this way, No. 2 will take 98 gold coins. However, No. 2's plan will be seen by No. 1, and No. 1 will propose [97, 0.1, 2, 0] or [97, O, 1, 0, 2], that is, give up No. 2, and Give No. 3 l gold coins. Give No. 4 or No. 5 2 coins at the same time. Since this plan of No. 1 is better for No. 3 and No. 4 or No. 5 than when No. 2 is allocated, they get their votes in favor. Plus No. 1 own ticket. No. 1 plan can be approved. 97 gold coins can easily fall into one's pocket. This is undoubtedly the plan for No. 1 to get the most benefit! The backward method is an effective tool to analyze the dynamic game under complete information, but in reality it is not a complete information game . Medium income, the key to the game is the distribution of income. When the size of the cake does not change with time, after the strength is compared, the corresponding cake share is selected according to the strength. When the cake shrinks with time, the negotiation itself is an example of cost: Imagine There was an ice cream cake on the table, and the two children were haggling
over the distribution. The cake keeps melting. We assume that every time a proposal or counter-proposal is made, the cake will
Shrink by the same amount towards zero. The reason why the negotiation is protracted is that the two parties have not reached a consensus on the extent of the reduction of the pie (the loss of benefits). In the game, an important factor that determines the way of dividing the pie is the waiting cost of each party. Although both parties may lose the same amount of benefits, one party may have other alternatives to reduce losses. Therefore, to reduce the bargaining power of one's own waiting costs to protect the bargaining power Late one night, two US economists after a meeting, to return to the hotel. They found a licensed taxi on the streets of Jerusalem and told the driver how to get to their hotel. The driver, who almost immediately recognized them as American guests, refused to hit the meter, promising them a better price than the metered amount. nature. The two were a little skeptical of such a promise.
On the premise that they are willing to pay according to the amount of the meter. Why does this strange driver make such a strange promise to charge less? How can they know if they have paid more? On the other hand, in addition to promising to pay according to the metered amount, There is no promise to pay the driver any more. If they're going to haggle with the driver and the fork falls apart, they'll have to find another taxi. Their thinking is. Once they get to the hotel, their bargaining position will improve considerably. What's more, it's really not easy to find a taxi at this moment.
So they set off by car and arrived at the hotel smoothly. The driver asked them to pay 2,500 shekels in Israel (equivalent to $2,75). Because haggling is very common in Israel, Americans haggle for 2,200 shekels. The driver got angry, locked all the doors without waiting for the other party to speak, and drove back according to the original road section. The driver drove back to the starting point. Throw them out of the car very roughly. While shouting: "Now go see for yourself how far your 2,200 shekels can go!"
They found another taxi. The driver started hitting the meter, and when it jumped to 2,200 shekels, they also returned to the hotel.
Undoubtedly, spending so much time was worth less than 300 shekels to the two economists. But the value of this story cannot be ignored. Because it shows what kind of dangers may arise in the face of an opponent who does not know how to bargain. Between these two things, self-esteem and rationality, we must learn to balance. If it only costs 20 cents more in total, it might be wiser to just pay when you arrive at your destination. There is a second lesson to this story. Imagine how much better their bargaining position would have been if two Americans had gotten out of the car to discuss price. If you rent a taxi. The line of thought should be the exact opposite. Suppose you tell the driver where you are going before getting in the car. Then there's a good chance you'll see the taxi abandon you and find a better customer. Remember, you'd better get in the car first and then tell the driver where you're going. This story also reminds us. We must learn to carve out the best bargaining position for ourselves by changing our position with our opponents. Path Dependence Our experience with the QWER keyboard forced us to continue using this poor technology. Through game theory, it can be seen that behavioral habits have a very important influence. The solution to this problem is to use a short-term and severe movement overspeed equilibrium ess strategy: that is, evolutionary stable strategy, which refers to the strategy adopted by most members of the population, and this If one strategy is better than other strategies, then it is the ess strategy. Therefore, for an individual, the best strategy depends on what the majority of members of the population are doing. So the herd effect makes sense. Using this law of conformity can solve some problems. Example: As the strength of the state of Chu increased. Conflicts with countries in the Central Plains are also increasing. The demand for combat vehicles has also increased accordingly. However, the folk custom of Chu is to ride a low cart, and the base of the folk ox cart is low, so it is not suitable for use as a carriage in wartime. The King of Chu was about to order the whole country to raise the base of the car. Sun Shuao said: "There are too many orders, and the people don't know what to do. This is not good. If you want to raise the base of the car, I request that the towns in various places raise the thresholds on both sides of the streets. The people who ride the car are all identities. The gentleman, they can't get off the car frequently for crossing the threshold, so they will naturally raise the base of the car."
The King of Chu obeyed. No decree was issued, but the government agencies uniformly gave up the low car. Change to take a high-speed car, and set higher thresholds at both ends of the town streets and lanes, so less than three months have passed. Bullock cart bases are raised across the country. Seeing this, we can already understand the wisdom Sun Shuao used in raising the threshold of the city. In his method, the height of the threshold is raised. It is equivalent to a punishment for a low car with a low base, and a convenience for a tall car. In the beginning, the "gentlemen" who used low cars were subject to various restrictions. All kinds of inconveniences are caused, and it is impossible to pass the threshold of the streets and alleys smoothly. At the same time, the high cars used by the government gave them a demonstration effect. In order to obtain this convenience. Retrofitting your own vehicle base is a logically advantageous strategy. What Sun Shushe's approach taught us is that a short-lived and immediate law enforcement process is far more efficient than any executive order that fails to touch existing habits, and is much more efficient than a long-term, moderate effort that involves the same force. law enforcement process. With little effort, guiding and controlling key parts of the problem can spread to global common knowledge: for an event, if all Boben parties have knowledge of the event, and all
parties Knowing that the other parties also know about the event, and that all parties know that all parties
know about the event, then the event is common knowledge. When a knowledge becomes common knowledge, the decision-making process changes accordingly, and the original closed information becomes public information, so we reason, I know he knows I know... Uncertainty can be divided into There are two main categories: subjective uncertainty and objective uncertainty. Subjective uncertainty refers to the fact that decision makers cannot make correct judgments about the attitude of things due to the lack of relevant information, but such judgments can be made by other people who have information. Information related to subjective uncertainty is often asymmetric. For individuals. The more information you have, the more likely you are to make the right decisions. For society, the more transparent the information. The more it helps to reduce people's transaction costs and improve social efficiency. Objective uncertainty refers to the uncertainty of the objective properties of the state of things. to this. People
can grasp objective laws through cognition. However, knowledge alone does not eliminate this uncertainty. Solve the problem of information asymmetry When the information is asymmetric, the phenomenon of bad money driving out good money is easy to occur, and adverse selection should be reduced. It is necessary to solve the problem of information asymmetry . The solution is that the principal or "high-quality" agent makes decisions through information, reducing the degree of information asymmetry between the principal and the agent. There are two ways to solve the problem: one is that the principal obtains the information asymmetry of the agent by formulating a set of strategies or contracts, which is "information screening"; the other is that the "high-quality" agent takes advantage of information to the agent. People disseminate their own private information, this is "information passing". Same reason. A good political system must be designed with separation and balance, so that officials who tell the truth and are not lazy and officials who do not tell the truth and are lazy have a choice, and filter out the worse officials. This is also a necessary condition for an administrative system to be efficient. A system must have good efficiency. Those with an informational advantage must be allowed to oversee officials. Who has the information advantage, of course, the local residents. Spencer points out: “In the used car market, if sellers of high-quality used cars can figure out a way to pay less than sellers of low-quality products, then that’s a high-quality messaging. , will be able to benefit from adequate compensation from market activity.” So for sellers of high-quality used cars, as long as the marginal cost of some way of signaling is low. There will be some kind of equilibrium in the market. Information transmission itself has a cost, and only products with a certain strength can afford this cost. Therefore, this behavior itself shields some inferior merchants. If the cost of sending a message is the same for everyone, it's useless. Therefore, the key to the information transmission model is: 1. Information transmission has a cost 2. The cost of letting different people send the same information is a different sieve of separation and equilibrium . The study of separation and equilibrium is that the party who owns the information actively publishes information, from different Classes are separated, so that it is profitable. Separation equalization is different from signaling: signaling is the study of how people with different information can separate themselves from their peers through signaling. Separation equilibrium is how people who do not have information design a mechanism to screen information, so that people with different information do not conceal information and behavior, thereby improving market efficiency. Several principles of information transmission first. If the body has several bad news to announce, several bad news should be announced to others at the same time. Combine several pieces of bad news, and the diminishing marginal utility they cause will minimize the total utility of each piece of bad news combined. People often hate the practice of making things worse and adding fuel to the fire, but really let people choose to suffer two injuries or one big injury. Within the limits of what they can bear, for many people, it is more refreshing to cut through the mess. second. If you have several good news to announce, you should separate the good news. You'll be happy twice by sharing these two pieces of good news in two days. Because hearing two good news twice is equal to experiencing two joys, the sum of the two joys is greater than the joy of enjoying two good news at once. The arrival of double happiness is certainly very pleasing, but every day of joy may bring more laughter.
Third, if you have a big piece of good news and a small piece of bad news, you should share the two with others. In this case. The pain of small bad news will dilute the joy of big good news, and the negative effects will be much smaller. For example, if you are called to your boss's office, you are told that you will receive a monthly salary increase of 150 yuan because of your outstanding performance. But unfortunately, you accidentally lost [00 yuan when you squeezed the bus, so you should tell your family both the news when you go home. Although I lost 100 yuan, it was nothing compared to the good news of a raise. Your family will not care about the lost 100 yuan.
fourth. If there is a big bad news and a small good news, they should be announced separately. That way, the joy of small good news is not overwhelmed by the pain of big bad news. People can still enjoy the joy of good news. for example. Now that the stock market is down, the stock you bought plummeted today, costing you 100,000 yuan. However, your luck is pretty good. While shopping at the supermarket, I got a box of chocolates worth 50 yuan. You should take these two pieces of news home over two days, and although your lover will be upset at the news of the stock loss, and maybe blame you for not having an investment vision, that doesn't stop her from tasting the sweetness of chocolate the next day. However, if you tell him two messages at the same time. Maybe she even tasted bitter when eating chocolate. The uncompromising strategy Xiahou Mao guarded Puyang. Lü Bu sent a general to pretend to come to surrender, but took the opportunity to hijack Xiahou Mao to claim the treasure. Han Hao led the army alone outside the camp gate. The generals were asked to hold still, and the military camps settled down. Han Hao went to the place where Xiahou Mao was, and scolded the hostage-takers and said: "You are cruel and stubborn, and you dare to kidnap our generals. Do you still want to live? I have accepted the order to attack the thieves. Do you indulge you when you kidnap?" Then he cried again and said to Xiahou Mao, "It's about the law of the country, what can I do?" After that, he quickly called up the army to attack the kidnappers. The hijacker was frightened and kowtowed for mercy. Han Hao immediately caught them all.
Cao Cao admired Han Hao's behavior very much. Order: From now on, if you encounter hostage-takers again, you must attack them with all your strength, and don’t be concerned about the hostages being taken. Since then, the hostage-taking has never happened again.
The reason why Cao Cao praised Han Hao is because he understands that only by adopting an uncompromising attitude can he be able to deter would-be hijackers to the greatest extent and dispel their idea of taking hostages for ransom. Only if the threat of never negotiating is credible will the hijackers realize that their actions are doomed to futile.
But the risks involved also tested Han Hao and Cao Cao. every time. In the event of a hijacking, once the threat has to be fulfilled, refusing to compromise could cost the hijackee's life. But this risk is precisely the touchstone that distinguishes a strategic leader from a short-sighted. Only the former can understand that surrendering once is not only as simple as meeting the demands of a group of hijackers, but will also induce more hijackings.
In fact, this way of thinking is the consensus of many policymakers. Brinkmanship To avoid death with the adversary, one must want to find a response that is just enough to deter the adversary without going overboard, by softening the threat and creating a risk rather than a certainty. Brinkmanship kicks the ball to the opponent and makes the opponent retreat.