现代大学英语精读第二版（第四册）学习笔记（原文及全文翻译）——3A - Groundless Beliefs（无根据的信念）

Unit 3A - Groundless Beliefs

Groundless Beliefs

Alfred Ernest Monder

In the future we are going to follow the practice—until it becomes a habit—of classifying propositions according to their grounds. Of every statement we come across, we shall ask: "HOW DO WE KNOW THAT? WHAT REASON HAVE WE FOR BELIEVING THAT? ON WHAT 'GROUND' IS THAT STATEMENT BASED?" Probably we shall be astonished at the number of propositions met with in everyday life which we shall find it necessary to class as groundless. They rest upon mere tradition, or on somebody's bare assertion unsupported by even a shadow of proof...

It may be a belief which we originally accepted as a result of simple "suggestion," and we have continued to hold it ever since. It has now become one of our regular habits of thought. Perhaps somebody-somewhere-sometime told us a certain thing, and quite uncritically we accepted and believed it. Perhaps it was way back in our early childhood—before we had even developed the power of questioning anything that might be told to us. Many of our strongest convictions were established then; and now, in adult life, we find it most difficult even to question their truth. They seem to us "obviously" true.

But if the staunchest Roman Catholic and the staunchest Presbyterian had been exchanged when infants, and if they had been brought up with home and all other influences reversed, we can have very little doubt what the result would have been. It is consistent with all our knowledge of psychology to conclude that each would have grown up holding exactly the opposite beliefs to those he holds now...and each would then have felt as sure of the truth of his opinion as he now feels—of the truth of the opposite opinion. The same thing is true, of course, of many beliefs other than those of a religious nature. If we had grown up in a community where polygamy or head-hunting, or infanticide, or gladiatorial fighting, or dueling, was regarded as the normal and natural thing—then we should have grown up to regard it as "obviously" natural and perfectly moral and proper. If an English baby had been adopted and brought up in a German home, and had grown up with no knowledge that his parents were English, all the sentiments and beliefs of that person would be "German" and not "English." Many of our beliefs—many of our most deeply rooted and fundamental convictions—are held simply as a result of the fact that we happen to have been "brought up" to them.

Of course we do not cease, when we cease to be children, to adopt new beliefs on mere suggestion. We continue doing it, more or less unconsciously all our lives: hence, to take only the most striking examples, the enormous influence of newspapers and the effectiveness of skillful advertising. Much of what passes as such is not, strictly, thinking at all. It is the mere "parroting" of ideas picked up by chance and adopted as our own without question. Most people, most of the time, are mere parrots. But as we leave childhood, we tend to accept only such new ideas as fit in with the ideas we already hold; and all conflicting ideas seem to us "obviously" absurd.

Propositions that are accepted simply because "everybody says so," must be classed under the same heading. The dogma may not be that of any particular individual: it may be a dogmatic statement which has been passed from one person to another, from generation to generation, perhaps for hundreds—perhaps for thousands—of years. It may be part of the traditional belief of the people or the race. In that case, it is part of our social inheritance from some period in the past. But we should fully face the fact that beliefs which are merely inherited from the past must have originated at a time when men knew much less than they know today. So the fact that a belief is "old" is no argument in its favor.

We need especially to be on our guard when we come across propositions which seem to be "obviously" true.

When we find ourselves entertaining an opinion about which there is a feeling that even to enquire into it would be absurd, unnecessary, undesirable, or wicked—we may know that that opinion is a non-rational one.

When we are tempted to say that any general truth is so "obvious" that it would be absurd even to question it, we should remember that the whole history of the development of human thought has been full of cases of such "obvious truths" breaking down when examined in the light of increasing knowledge and reason. For instance, for ages nothing could have seemed more obvious, more utterly beyond question than the proposition that slavery was natural, reasonable, necessary, and right. Some kinds of men were "obviously" "slaves by nature." To doubt it was impossible.

Again for more than two thousand years, it was "impossible to conceive" the planets as moving in paths other than circles. The circle was "obviously" the perfect figure; and so it was "natural" and "inevitable" to suppose that the planets moved in circles. The age-long struggle of the greatest intellects in the world to shake off that assumption is one of the marvels of history.

It was formerly "obvious" that the heart—and not the brain—was the organ of consciousness. To most people today it seems equally "obvious" that we think with our brains. Many modern persons find it very difficult to credit the fact that men can ever have supposed otherwise. Yet—they did.

That the earth must be flat, formerly seemed so obvious and self-evident that the very suggestion of any other possibility would have been—and was—regarded as a joke.

It was for two thousand years "taken for granted" as "obvious" that a heavy weight must fall faster than a light one. An assumed or dogmatic proposition which had been universally accepted as "obvious"; and which, when challenged, was supported by reference to a dogma of Aristotle. Until Galileo actually demonstrated the contrary, nothing could have seemed more beyond possibility of doubt.

Propositions which are accepted blindly, without question, on the grounds of mere assumption or dogma, need to be frankly recognized as such. Progress in human thought seems to consist mainly in getting rid of such ideas.

Other beliefs are held through self-interest. Modern psychology leaves us no room for doubt on this point. We adopt and cling to some beliefs because—or partly because—it "pays" us to do so. But, as a rule, the person concerned is about the last person in the world to be able to recognize this in himself. Indeed, he would probably be highly indignant if told of what anyone familiar with modern psychology can recognize so plainly. It would be quite wrong to attribute all opinions—even political opinions—to self-interest. But it would be equally wrong to deny that this is one potent factor.

"Self-interest" is to be understood first in the ordinary sense, as referring to a man's way of earning his livelihood and acquiring wealth. But we may extend the term to cover also his interest in social position; popularity with his fellows; the respect and goodwill of those whose respect and goodwill he values. It covers his interest in his own career; in whatever prestige he enjoys as one of the leaders—or at least as a valued supporter—of some movement or institution, some religious body, some other kind of society or group. There is many a man who is unconsciously compelled to cling to a belief because he is a "somebody" in some circle—and if he were to abandon that belief, he would find himself nobody at all.

Putting it broadly, we should always suspect any of our opinions when we recognize that our happiness depends, directly or indirectly, upon our continuing to hold them—when we might lose anything, material or otherwise, by changing our opinion.

Somewhat similar is the acceptance of an opinion through the desire—probably not recognized by the person concerned—to justify his own nature, his own position, or his own behavior. The coward can so easily adopt a philosophy which seems to justify cowardice—though, of course, "cowardice" is not the name he gives it! The lazy and bungling person can adopt a set of opinions which prove to his satisfaction that "the grapes are sour"—the "grapes" being the rewards that more energetic and competent men can win.

Many groundless opinions are held through sentimental associations. The thought is associated with memories—pleasant or unpleasant as the case may be—of particular persons who held similar opinions. It is found that many a man who in childhood was hostile to his father, in after life is always prejudiced against whatever opinions his father used to express. And conversely in the case of one who has pleasant recollections of his father, his mother, a teacher perhaps, or some other person who played a big part in his early life.

In adult life, as we have often observed, a bitter quarrel may change a man's opinion entirely. Antagonism to a man usually produces some antagonism to his opinions; and the bitterness felt against the man usually spreads to the idea for which he stands. What keen satisfaction we find in belittling the opinions, or attacking the opinions, of somebody of whom we are jealous, or of somebody against whom we bear a grudge! But, on the other hand, it is equally true that friendly feelings to a man have an effect in disposing us to feel friendly to his views.

Other opinions again are determined by what we may best call Fashion. To take one example: how largely our opinions on the merits of certain authors, or poets, or composers, are dictated merely by fashion! But the effect of fashion is very much wider than that: we trace it almost everywhere, in every field of thought. We tend very strongly to feel and to believe as others are feeling and believing. Not all others, perhaps; but others of our own set.

But we do not, as a rule, continue all our lives changing our sentiments and opinions with every change of fashion. Sooner or later our minds become fixed. Many a man holds his opinions today—because they happened to be in fashion ten, twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty years ago.

Once an opinion is accepted, whatever be the cause of its acceptance, it has a strong tendency to persist. Every time we think along a particular thought-pattern, makes it easier for us to think the same way again. It is quite legitimate to speak of "habits" of thought. The "brain path" becomes so well worn; the pattern of brain-centers becomes so well connected up by continual use, that the nerve current finds a route of practically no resistance, and so it always takes almost exactly the same course.

We all know the person who has a string of stock anecdotes. We all know too the person who has certain stock arguments and opinions which he expresses, almost in the same words, whenever he receives the "cue." We all know men and women whose minds work like gramophones. Put them on to the "record" about the good old days; or about prohibition; or about the wicked capitalist; or about the lazy and improvident workers; or about the country going to the dogs; or about the modern girl; or some long, tedious anecdote about what I said to him, and what he said to me, and I said... and he said... and then I told him straight...! All we have to do is to start him off—and nothing on earth can stop him—until the "record" has run out!

The same thing is true of opinions and beliefs of all kinds. After they have been held a certain length of time, they become, as it were, so stamped in by continual use that it is almost impossible now to change them. While we are young, we are continually taking in new ideas, altering our thought-patterns, "making up our minds" afresh. As we grow older, we become less and less able to accept any new idea which will not fit in with our existing thought-pattern. Thus we become, in James's term, Old Fogeys. Sometimes our thought-patterns set while we are still quite young. In a few rare cases they remain open or alterable even into old age. An Old Fogey may have become such at seventeen—or seventy. "I am almost afraid to say so (says James), but I believe that in the majority of human beings Old Fogeyism begins at about the age of twenty-five."

Yet when full allowance has been made for all these non-rational factors in the determination of opinion, there remains—not in all minds, not in most minds, but in some—a desire to discover the facts; to think things out in a clear and rational way; to get at the truth at all costs, whatever it may turn out to be! For such minds this... is written.

参考译文——无根据的信念

无根据的信念

艾尔弗雷德·欧内斯特·曼德

今后，我们将按依据来划分各种观点--直至这种做法成为一种习惯。对于我们所遇到的每一种观点，我们都应该问：“我们是如何知道的？我们有什么理由相信它？这种说法有什么‘根据’？我们可能会吃惊地发现，日常生活中我们所见到的大量说法有必要归类为毫无根据的说法。这些说法或是仅仅基于传统，或是仅仅基于某人毫无证据的断言……

情况很可能是这样的：我们最初仅仅因为别人的“暗示”而接受了这样的观点，并且此后我们继续坚持这种观点。这种观点现在已成为我们不变的思维习惯。也许某人于某时、某地告诉我们某件事，我们就不加评判地接受并相信了。这种做法或许可以追溯到我们早期的童年时代--在我们有能力质疑别人可能告诉我们的任何事情之前。我们的许多根深蒂固的信念都是那时建立起来的；而现在长大了，我们却发现甚至很难对这些信念的真实性提出质疑。这些信念在我们看来“显然”是正确无疑的。

但是，如果最虔诚的罗马天主教徒和长老会信徒在婴儿时期就被互相交换，并且在相反的家庭环境和其他影响下被抚养成人，其结果几乎不会有什么悬念。根据我们所掌握的全部心理学知识，我们可以得出结论，两人长大后会持有与现在完全相反的观点……每个人于是就会像现在确信自己的观点正确无疑一样--去相信对方观点的正确性。当然，宗教信仰以外的许多观念也是如此。如果我们生长的社会中，多配偶制、割取敌方首级作为战利品、杀害婴儿、持剑格斗，或者武力决斗等被视为是正常和自然的事情--那么我们长大后就会认为这些做法“显然”是自然的、完全符合道义和正常的。如果一个英国婴儿被一个德国家庭收养并抚养长大，成人后完全不知道自己的父母是英国人，那么他的所有情感与观念就会是“德国式”的而非“英国式”的。我们的许多观点--许多最根深蒂固的基本的信念--完全是由我们在这些观点中被“抚养长大”这个事实所决定的。

当然，我们成年后继续凭借“启发”和“暗示”接受新观点。我们在一生中或多或少无意识地这样继续着。这里只需要举几个最明显的例子，如报刊的巨大影响力和巧妙的广告效应。许多诸如此类的流传的观点在严格意义上来说根本不是思想。不过是鹦鹉学舌般的盲目重复偶然的获得，不加质疑地变成自己的想法。多数人在大多时候仅仅是鹦鹉学舌而已。但是随着我们告别儿童时代，我们更容易只接受那些与自己已有观点相一致的新观点；所有与其发生冲突的观点在我们看来似乎“显而易见”是荒谬的。

仅仅因为“每个人都这么说”而被接受的观点也应归入此类范畴。这种教条可能并非某个特定个人的观点，而可能是一个人传给另一个人，一代人传给下一代人而形成的教条性的观点，有可能已流传了几百年一甚至数千年了。这种教条可能是某个民族或种族的传统观念的一部分。在这种情况下，它是我们从过去某一历史时期传承下来的社会遗产的一部分。但是，我们应该充分认识到这样一个事实，即仅仅从过去继承下来的观点必定源于某个时期，那时人们的认知水平远不如今天。因此因为一个观点很“古老”而接受它是靠不住的。

当遇到某些看似“显而易见”正确的观点时，我们需要格外警觉。

当我们发觉自己持有一种观点，并且认为对它的任何探究都显得荒谬、多余、不受欢迎或者恶毒时--我们就可以说这种观点是非理性的。

当我们想说任何普遍真理都是“显而易见”的，以致甚至对其提出质疑都是荒谬的时候，我们应该记住，在人类思想的整个发展历史过程中都充满了这种“显而易见的真理”现象，经过人类不断增长的知识与理性的检验，而不攻自破的情况。例如，很多年以来人们认为奴隶制是很自然、合理、必要而且正确的，似乎没有什么比这更显而易见、更不容置疑的观点。某些人“显然”是“天生的奴隶”。那时质疑这种观点是不可能的。

同样，两千多年来人们“不可能想象”行星是以轨道而非圆周的形式运行的。而圆形“显然”是最完美的图形；因此设想行星按圆周的轨道运行是“很自然的”而且“不可避免的”。世界上最伟大的智者们经过长期斗争推翻了这一设想，这成为历史上的一大奇迹。

心脏--而非大脑--是意识的器官，这在以前是“显而易见的”。如今对大多数人来说我们用大脑思考同样地“显而易见”。许多现代人觉得很难相信人们曾做出另一种设想。然而--人们的确这样做过。

地球一定是平的，过去在人们看来，这是显而易见且不言自明的，而任何其他可能的说法都会--事实上也的确--被认为是个玩笑。

一个重物体一定会比轻物体下落的速度快，两千年来这种观点一直被认为是“理所当然”且“显而易见”的。这个设想或教条性的观点已作为“显而易见”的事实而被普遍接受；当它面临挑战时，人们就会引述亚里士多德的教条来加以支持。在伽利略证明与之完全相反的事实之前，人们认为，世上没有比这更加无可置疑的了。

所有那些被盲目地、不加质疑地、仅凭假设或教条而接受的观点都需要人们像这样坦率地正确认识。人类思想的进步似乎主要在于摒弃这样盲目的观点。

人们持有其他观点是出于利己之心。现代心理学使我们对这一点深信不疑。我们接受并且坚持某些观点是因为--或者部分是因为--这样做可以让我们“获益”。不过，一般说来出于利己之心持有某种观点的人大概是世上最不可能在自己身上意识到这一点的人。实际上，如果有人告诉他，住何熟悉现代心理学的人都能够清楚地看出这一点，他可能会十分愤慨。将所有的观点--甚至政治观点--都归因于利己主义是相当错误的。但是，否认自身利益是一个有力因素同样也是错误的。

从一般意义上讲，“利己”首先应该理解为一个人谋生、获取财富的一种方式。但是我们可以把这个词的意思引申到一个人对社会地位的兴趣；受伙伴欢迎的程度；以及来自他所重视的人的尊重与友善。利己还包括一个人对自己事业的兴趣，以及作为某运动或机构，某个宗教团体、某个其他社团或群体的领导者之一--或者至少是作为一位受重视的支持者--而享有的声望。有许多人无意识地被迫坚持某种观点，因为他在某个圈子里是个“重要人物”--如果他一旦摒弃那个观点，他就会发现自己不过是一个无名之辈。

从广义上说，当我们认识到自己的幸福直接或间接地取决于能否继续坚持自己的观点--如果我们改变观点可能会失去某种东西，包括物质或其他方面的利益时--我们就应该总是对这样的观点持怀疑态度。

与此有几分相似的情况是因渴望证明自己的本质、地位或行为是正当的而接受某种观点，尽管他自己很可能并没有意识到这点。懦夫会很容易接受一种似乎为懦弱辩护的哲学——但是，当然，他绝不会用“懦弱”这个词！懒惰而笨拙的人会接受一套让自己满意的观点来证明“葡萄是酸的”--而“葡萄”就是那些更加精明能干的人获取的回报。

许多毫无根据的观点由于情感联想而为人所有。思维与有着相同观点的人群的记忆有关联--不管这些记忆令人高兴或令人不悦。人们发现，许多在童年时代对父亲怀有敌意的人在以后的生活中总是对父亲曾表达过的任何看法都有成见。不过，如果一个人对自己的父亲、母亲，或许是老师，或对其早期生活有很大影响的其他人拥有美好记忆的话，情况则相反。

正如我们经常看到的一样，在成人生活里，一场激烈的争吵会完全改变一个人的观点。对某人的敌对往往会导致对他的观点的敌对；对某人的怨恨也常常会殃及他的观点。我们在贬低或攻击那些我们妒忌或怀恨的人的观点时会获得多么强烈的满足感呀！但是，从另一方面来说，对某个人的友好情感无疑会使我们对他的看法也感到友好。

还有，其他一些观点是由我们可以称之为“潮流”的东西来决定的。举例来说，我们对某些作家、诗人或作曲家的评价在很大程度上只是受时尚潮流左右！但是，时尚的影响力远比这更广泛：我们几乎在每个地方、每个思想领域都能发现它的踪迹。我们非常强烈地倾向于像其他人那样去感受或相信同样的事物。或许不是所有其他人，而是和我们同一类的人。

但是一般说来，我们不会在自己的一生当中不断地随时尚潮流的每次变化而改变自己的情感和观点。迟早有一天我们的思想会固定下来。许多人之所以持有他今天的观点--是因为那些观点碰巧在10年、20年、30年、40年或50年前曾经流行过。

一旦某个观点被人接受，不论接受的原因是什么，它都有相当大的可能继续存在下去。每—次我们都要按某一特定的思维方式思考，而按统一方式思考要容易得多。这就可以称作思维“习惯”。“思路”变得如此陈旧；神经中枢的模式由于不断使用而变得如此相互连贯，以致神经流实际上找到了一条没有阻力的路线，于是它几乎总是走相同的线路。

我们也都认识那个总有某些陈腐观点和看法来发表的人，无论他何时收到“暗示”，他都几乎会用同样的话语来表达。我们都知道一些男女的大脑像留声机一样运转。放张“唱片”在上面，它会播放有关过去的好日子；禁酒时期；恶毒的资本家们；懒惰又得过且过的工人们、国家状况越来越糟、摩登女郎，又或者是某些冗长乏味的轶事，我对他说的话，他说给我的话，我说的……他说的……然后我又直接地告诉他……！这样的人只要我们给他开个头，他就会一直说下去--世上没有什么可以让他停下来--直到“唱片”全部放完！

所有的观点与信念都是如此。人们在持有一段时间之后，可以说，由于不断被使用已在人们脑海中打上了深深的烙印，以致现在几乎无法改变。我们年轻时不断地接受新观念，改变着我们的思维模式，并重新“做出决定”。随着我们逐渐衰老，我们越来越没有能力接受任何不符合我们已有思维方式的新观点。于是，我们变成了詹姆士所说的“老顽固”。有时候，我们的思维模式在我们还相当年轻时就已定型。有时，那些思维模式甚至在高龄时期还保持开放或者变通，但这种情况极为罕见。一个人可能会在十七岁或七十岁变成“老顽固”。“我几乎不敢这样说（詹姆士语），但是我相信，对于大多数人来说“顽固不化”大约在二十五岁时就开始了。”

尽管在确定思维的过程中有上述种种非理性的因素需要我们充分考虑在内，但仍然有人--虽然不是所有人，也不是多数人，但是有些人--脑子里渴望了解事实，清楚理性地考虑事情的方方面面；不惜任何代价地去寻求真理，而不管真相是什么！本文就为有这种头脑的人……所写。

Key Words:

groundless ['graundlis]

adj. 无根据的

merely ['miəli]

adv. 仅仅，只不过

cease [si:s]

v. 停止，终止

entertaining [entə'teiniŋ]

adj. 引起乐趣的，娱乐性的，令人愉快的 n. 招待

consciousness ['kɔnʃəsnis]

n. 意识，知觉，自觉，觉悟

proposition [.prɔpə'ziʃən]

n. 建议，命题，主张

dogmatic [dɔg'mætik]

adj. 教条的，武断的

energetic [.enə'dʒetik]

adj. 精力旺盛的，有力的，能量的

keen [ki:n]

adj. 锋利的，敏锐的，强烈的，精明的，热衷的

improvident [im'prɔvidənt]

adj. 不顾将来的，无远见的，不节约的，不经济的

allowance [ə'lauəns]

n. 津贴，零用钱，允许，限额，折扣，允差，考虑

continual [kən'tinjuəl]

adj. 不断的，频繁的

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