现代大学英语精读第二版（第五册）学习笔记（原文及全文翻译）——12 - The Indispensable Opposition（不可缺少的反对派）

Unit 12 - The Indispensable Opposition

The Indispensable Opposition

Walter Lippmann

Were they pressed hard enough, most men would probably confess that political freedom—that is to say, the right to speak freely and to act in opposition—is a noble ideal rather than a practical necessity. As the case for freedom is generally put today, the argument lends itself to this feeling. It is made to appear that, whereas each man claims his freedom as a matter of right, the freedom he accords to other men is a matter of toleration. Thus, the defense of freedom of opinion tends to rest not on its substantial, beneficial, and indispensable consequences, but on a somewhat eccentric, a rather vaguely benevolent, attachment to an abstraction.

It is all very well to say with Voltaire,"I wholly disapprove of what you say, but will defend to the death your right to say it," but as a matter of fact most men will not defend to the death the rights of other men: If they disapprove sufficiently of what other men say, they will somehow suppress those men if they can.

So, if this is the best that can be said for liberty of opinion, that a man must tolerate his opponents because everyone has a "right" to say what he pleases, then we shall find that liberty of opinion is a luxury, safe only in pleasant times when men can be tolerant because they are not deeply and vitally concerned.

Yet actually, as a matter of historic fact, there is a much stronger foundation for the great constitutional right of freedom of speech, and as a matter of practical human experience there is a much more compelling reason for cultivating the habits of free men. We take, it seems to me, a naively self-righteous view when we argue as if the right of our opponents to speak were something that we protect because we are magnanimous, noble, and unselfish.

The compelling reason why, if liberty of opinion did not exist, we should have to invent it, why it will eventually have to be restored in all civilized countries where it is now suppressed, is that we must protect the right of our opponents to speak because we must hear what they have to say.

We miss the whole point when we imagine that we tolerate the freedom of our political opponents as we tolerate a howling baby next door, as we put up with the blasts from our neighbor's radio because we are too peaceable to heave a brick through the window. If this were all there is to freedom of opinion, that we are too good natured or too timid to do anything about our opponents and our critics except to let them talk, it would be difficult to say whether we are tolerant because we are magnanimous or because we are lazy, because we have strong principles or because we lack serious convictions, whether we have the hospitality of an inquiring mind or the indifference of an empty mind. And so, if we truly wish to understand why freedom is necessary in a civilized society, we must begin by realizing that, because freedom of discussion improves our own opinions, the liberties of other men are our own vital necessity.

We are much closer to the essence of the matter, not when we quote Voltaire, but when we go to the doctor and pay him to ask us the most embarrassing questions and to prescribe the most disagreeable diet. When we pay the doctor to exercise complete freedom of speech about the cause and cure of our stomachache, we do not look upon ourselves as tolerant and magnanimous, and worthy to be admired by ourselves. We have enough common sense to know that if we threaten to put the doctor in jail because we do not like the diagnosis and the prescription it will be unpleasant for the doctor, to be sure, but equally unpleasant for our own stomachache.

That is why even the most ferocious dictator would rather be treated by a doctor who was free to think and speak the truth than by his own Minister of Propaganda. For there is a point, the point at which things really matter, where the freedom of others is no longer a question of their right but of our own need.

The point at which we recognize this need is much higher in some men than in others. The totalitarian rulers think they do not need the freedom of an opposition: They exile, imprison, or shoot their opponents. We have concluded on the basis of practical experience, which goes back to Magna Carta and beyond, that we need the opposition. We pay the opposition salaries out of the public treasury.

In so far as the usual apology for freedom of speech ignores this experience, it becomes abstract and eccentric rather than concrete and human. The emphasis is generally put on the right to speak, as if all that mattered were that the doctor should be free to go out into the park and explain to the empty air why I have a stomachache. Surely that is a miserable caricature of the great civic right which men have bled and died for. What really matters is that the doctor should tell me what ails me, that I should listen to him; that if I do not like what he says I should be free to call in another doctor; and that then the first doctor should have to listen to the second doctor; and that out of all the speaking and listening, the give-and-take of opinions, the truth should be arrived at.

This is the creative principle of freedom of speech, not that it is a system for the tolerating of error, but that it is a system for finding the truth. It may not produce the truth, or the whole truth all the time, or often, or in some cases ever.

But if the truth can be found, there is no other system which will normally and habitually find so much truth. Until we have thoroughly understood this principle, we shall not know why we must value our liberty, or how we can protect and develop it.

Let us apply this principle to the system of public speech in a totalitarian state. We may, without any serious falsification, picture a condition of affairs in which the mass of the people are being addressed through one broadcasting system by one man and his chosen subordinates. The orators speak. The audience listens but cannot and dare not speak back. It is a system of one-way communication; the opinions of the rulers are broadcast outwardly to the mass of the people. But nothing comes back to the rulers from the people except the cheers; nothing returns in the way of knowledge of forgotten facts, hidden feelings, neglected truths, and practical suggestions.

But even a dictator cannot govern by his own one-way inspiration alone. In practice, therefore, the totalitarian rulers get back the reports of the secret police and of their party henchmen down among the crowd. If these reports are competent, the rulers may manage to remain in touch with public sentiment. Yet that is not enough to know what the audience feels. The rulers have also to make great decisions that have enormous consequences, and here their system provides virtually no help from the give-and-take of opinion in the nation. So they must either rely on their own intuition, which cannot be permanently and continually inspired, or, if they are intelligent despots, encourage their trusted advisers and their technicians to speak and debate freely in their presence.

On the walls of the houses of Italian peasants one may see inscribed in large letters the legend, "Mussolini is always right." But if that legend is taken seriously by Italian ambassadors, by the Italian General Staff, and by the Ministry of Finance, then all one can say is heaven help Mussolini, heaven help Italy, and the new Emperor of Ethiopia.

For at some point, even in a totalitarian state, it is indispensable that there should exist the freedom of opinion which causes opposing opinions to be debated. As time goes on, that is less and less easy under a despotism; critical discussion disappears as the internal opposition is liquidated in favor of men who think and feel alike. That is why the early successes of despots, of Napoleon I and of Napoleon III, have usually been followed by an irreparable mistake. For in listening only to his yes men—the others being in exile or in concentration camps, or terrified—the despot shuts himself off from the truth that no man can dispense with.

We know all this well enough when we contemplate the dictatorships. But when we try to picture our own system, by way of contrast, what picture do we have in our minds? It is, is it not, that anyone may stand up on his own soapbox and say anything he pleases, like the individuals in Kipling's poem who sit each in his separate star and draw the Thing as they see it for the God of Things as they are. Kipling, perhaps, could do this, since he was a poet. But the ordinary mortal isolated on his separate star will have a hallucination, and a citizenry declaiming from separate soapboxes will poison the air with hot and nonsensical confusion.

If the democratic alternative to the totalitarian one-way broadcasts is a row of separate soapboxes, then I submit that the alternative is unworkable, is unreasonable, and is humanly unattractive. It is above all a false alternative.

It is not true that liberty has developed among civilized men when anyone is free to set up a soapbox, is free to hire a hall where he may expound his opinions to those who are willing to listen. On the contrary, freedom of speech is established to achieve its essential purpose only when different opinions are expounded in the same hall to the same audience.

For, while the right to talk may be the beginning of freedom, the necessity of listening is what makes the right important. Even in Russia and Germany a man may still stand in an open field and speak his mind. What matters is not the utterance of opinions. What matters is the confrontation of opinions in debate. No man can care profoundly that every fool should say what he likes. Nothing has been accomplished if the wisest man proclaims his wisdom in the middle of the Sahara Desert. This is the shadow. We have the substance of liberty when the fool is compelled to listen to the wise man and learn; when the wise man is compelled to take account of the fool, and to instruct him; when the wise man can increase his wisdom by hearing the judgment of his peers.

That is why civilized men must cherish liberty—as a means of promoting the discovery of truth. So we must not fix our whole attention on the right of anyone to hire his own hall, to rent his own broadcasting station, to distribute his own pamphlets. These rights are incidental; and though they must be preserved, they can be preserved only, by regarding them as incidental, as auxiliary to the substance of liberty that must be cherished and cultivated.

Freedom of speech is best conceived, therefore, by having in mind the picture of a place like the American Congress, an assembly where opposing views are represented, where ideas are not merely uttered but debated, or the British Parliament, where men who are free to speak are also compelled to answer. We may picture the true condition of freedom as existing in a place like a court of law, where witnesses testify and are cross-examined, where the lawyer argues against the opposing lawyer before the same judge and in the presence of one jury.

We may picture freedom as existing in a forum where the speaker must respond to questions; in a gathering of scientists where the data, the hypothesis, and the conclusion are submitted to men competent to judge them; in a reputable newspaper which not only will publish the opinions of those who disagree but will reexamine its own opinion in the light of what they say.

Thus the essence of freedom of opinion is not in mere toleration as such, but in the debate which toleration provides: It is not in the venting of opinion, but in the confrontation of opinion. That this is the practical substance can readily be understood when we remember how differently we feel and act about the censorship and regulation of opinion purveyed by different media of communication. We find then that, in so far as the medium makes difficult the confrontation of opinion in debate, we are driven towards censorship and regulation.

There is, for example, the whispering campaign, the circulation of anonymous rumors by men who cannot be compelled to prove what they say. They put the utmost strain on our tolerance, and there are few who do not rejoice when the anonymous slanderer is caught, exposed, and punished. At a higher level there is the moving picture, a most powerful medium for conveying ideas, but a medium which does not permit debate. A moving picture cannot be answered effectively by another moving picture; in all free countries there is some censorship of the movies, and there would be more if the producers did not recognize their limitations by avoiding political controversy. There is then the radio. Here debate is difficult: It is not easy to make sure that the speaker is being answered in the presence of the same audience. Inevitably, there is some regulation of the radio.

When we reach the newspaper press, the opportunity for debate is so considerable that discontent cannot grow to the point where under normal conditions there is any disposition to regulate the press. But when newspapers abuse their power by injuring people who have no means of replying, a disposition to regulate the press appears. When we arrive at Congress we find that, because the membership of the House is so large, full debate is impracticable. So there are restrictive rules. On the other hand, in the Senate, where the conditions of full debate exist, there is almost absolute freedom of speech.

This shows us that the preservation and development of freedom of opinion are not only a matter of adhering to abstract legal rights, but also, and very urgently, a matter of organizing and arranging sufficient debate. Once we have a firm hold on the central principle, there are many practical conclusions to be drawn. We then realize that the defense of freedom of opinion consists primarily in perfecting the opportunity for an adequate give-and-take of opinion; it consists also in regulating the freedom of those revolutionists who cannot or will not permit or maintain debate when it does not suit their purposes.

We must insist that free oratory is only the beginning of free speech; it is not the end, but a means to an end. The end is to find the truth. The practical justification of civil liberty is not that self-expression is one of the rights of man. It is that the examination of opinion is one of the necessities of man. For experience tells us that it is only when freedom of opinion becomes the compulsion to debate that the seed which our fathers planted has produced its fruit. When that is understood, freedom will be cherished not because it is a vent for our opinions but because it is the surest method of correcting them.

The unexamined life, said Socrates, is unfit to be lived by man. This is the virtue of liberty, and the ground on which we may best justify our belief in it, that it tolerates error in order to serve the truth. When men are brought face to face with their opponents, forced to listen and learn and mend their ideas, they cease to be children and savages and begin to live like civilized men. Then only is freedom a reality, when men may voice their opinions because they must examine their opinions.

The only reason for dwelling on all this is that if we are to preserve democracy we must understand its principles. And the principle which distinguishes it from all other forms of government is that in a democracy the opposition not only is tolerated as constitutional but must be maintained because it is in fact indispensable.

The democratic system cannot be operated without effective opposition. For, in making the great experiment of governing people by consent rather than by coercion, it is not sufficient that the party in power should have a majority. It is just as necessary that the party in power should never outrage the minority. That means that it must listen to the minority and be moved by the criticisms of the minority. That means that its measures must take account of the minority's objections, and that in administering measures it must remember that the minority may become the majority.

The opposition is indispensable. A good statesman, like any other sensible human being, always learns more from his opponents than from his fervent supporters. For his supporters will push him to disaster unless his opponents show him where the dangers are. So if he is wise he will often pray to be delivered from his friends, because they will ruin him. But, though it hurts, he ought also to pray never to be left without opponents; for they keep him on the path of reason and good sense.

The national unity of a free people depends upon a sufficiently even balance of political power to make it impracticable for the administration to be arbitrary and for the opposition to be revolutionary and irreconcilable. Where that balance no longer exists, democracy perishes. For unless all the citizens of a state are forced by circumstances to compromise, unless they feel that they can affect policy but that no one can wholly dominate it, unless by habit and necessity they have to give and take, freedom cannot be maintained.

参考译文——不可缺少的反对派

不可缺少的反对派

沃尔特·李普曼

倘若充分加以探究，大多数人可能都会承认，政治自由——自由说话和采取对立行动的权利——是崇高的理想，而非实际需要，因为现今人们一般是这样看待自由的，上述论点适合于这种想法。挑明了来看，尽管人人声称自由是权利问题，个人给予他人的那份自由却是宽容问题。因此，人们往往不是从言论自由那巨大、有益和不可或缺的结果来为它辩护，而是把它看成多少有些古怪、依稀让人觉得慷慨仁慈、和一种抽象概念联系在一起的东西。

借用伏尔泰的话是十分恰当的：“我完全不赞成你所说的话，但是我愿至死捍卫你说话的权利。”不过，事实上大多数人不会至死捍卫他人的权利：要是他们很不赞成他人的言论，只要可能他们就会设法去压制那些人。

因此，如果主张舆论自由的最好的说法是：个人必须容忍他的反对者，因为人人都有“权利”畅所欲言，那么我们将会发现舆论自由是一种奢侈，只有在切身重要利益不受影响从而能够做到宽容的愉快情境下才能确保这份奢侈。

不过实际上，从历史事实来看，言论自由的伟大宪法权利有着坚固得多的基础，从人类实际经验来看，也有更加令人信服得多的理由去培养自由的人的习惯。在我看来，我们争论时采取了一种幼稚的自以为是的观点，好像我们保护对手的言论权利是由于我们的大度、高尚而且无私。

倘若并不存在舆论自由，我们何以非得无中生有，何以这种自由在现今受到压制的所有文明国度中最终非得恢复，令人信服的理由就在于，因为我们必须听到反对者非要说什么，所以我们才必须保护他们的权利。

假如我们容忍政敌的自由就像容忍隔壁号啕大哭的婴儿那样，就像忍受邻居收音机的轰鸣那样，因为我们太讲究太平而不会扔石头砸破窗户，那么我们就是不得要领。假如这就是言论自由的全部含义，也就是说我们太和善或太胆怯，只能束手无策地听任我们的反对者和批评者发表言论，那么就难以说清，我们宽容是由于我们大度还是懈怠，是由于抱着坚定的原则还是缺乏严肃的信念，是由于我们对探索的头脑抱以善意还是对空洞的头脑漠然置之。因此，如果我们真正希望理解一个文明社会中必然要有自由的道理，我们必须首先认识到，讨论的自由改进了我们自己的见解，所以他人的自由权利乃是我们自身重要的需要。

我们更加接近问题实质的时候并不是引述伏尔泰的话，而是我们求医看病，付钱给他，请他问我们一些最令人尴尬的问题，并且请他开出最讨厌的医嘱饮食。我们付钱请医生行使充分的言论自由，让他说明胃痛起因，对症下药，这时我们并不觉得自己宽容大度，值得自我钦佩。我们具有充分的常识，懂得要是因为不喜欢医生的诊断和处方而以关进监狱相威逼，那么可以肯定，不仅医生感到不快，而且对我们的胃痛也没有好处。

正因为这个道理，即使最凶残的暴君也宁愿接受一位独立思考、直言不讳的医生的治疗，而不会求助于手下的宣传部长。因为存在着程度问题，到了那个程度情况确实严重了，于是他人的自由便不再是他们的权利问题，而是我们自身需要的问题。

对某些人来说，认识这种需要的程度要高于别人。极权统治者认为，他们无须保护反对派的自由，于是便对反对者处以流放、监禁或枪决。根据可以追溯到《大宪章》或更早的实际经验，我们已经得出结论：我们需要反对派。我们的财政部向反对派支付薪金。

如果为言论自由而做的通常辩护忽视了这种经验，辩护就变得抽象怪异，而不再是具体的合乎人性的。一般偏重的是说话权利，似乎至关重要的是医生应该自由走进公园，对着空空如也的空气说明我胃痛的原因。无疑这是对多少人为之流血牺牲的伟大民权的一种可悲嘲讽。问题真正的关键在于：医生应该把折磨我的病情告诉我本人，我也应该听从医嘱；如果觉得他的话不顺耳，我应该可以另请高明；那时第一位医生应该听听第二位医生的意见；大家边说边听，交换意见，应该求得真理。

这是言论自由的创造性原则，并非说它是一种容忍错误的体制，而是说它是一种发现真理的体制。它可能产生不了真理，永远、经常或总是在某些情形中产生不了全部真理。

不过，真理要是能够为人发现，那就没有其他体制可以正常和惯常地发现这类真理。只有在彻底理解了这条原则之后，我们才会懂得为什么必须珍惜我的自由或我们怎样才能保护和发展这种自由。

我们且把这条原则应用于一个极权国家公众言论的体制。我们可以不做严重歪曲地想象这样一个事态：通过广播设备，一个人和由他选出的下属在向民众发表演讲。演讲者高谈阔论。听众静听而不能也不敢回嘴。这是一言堂的交流体制，统治者的意见向外广播给民众听。除了喝彩声，人民没有任何声音反馈给统治者；也没有任何东西以了解遗忘的事实、隐藏的情绪、忽视的真相、实际的建议的途径转达回来。

不过即使一个独裁者也无法单凭一言堂的授意实行统治。因此，实际上极权统治者们从秘密警察和安插在群众中的党徒亲信那里弄回汇报内容。如果这些汇报内容是法定许可统治者有可能设法与公众情绪保持一致。但是知道听众的感受还远远不够，统治者还得做出具有巨大影响的重大决策，在这方面上他们的体制在全国进行意见交流过程中其实提供不了任何帮助。所以他们要么必须依靠手中的权力机构，而机构是无法永远不断地起激励作用的，要么如果是聪明的专制君主的话，就鼓励受到信赖的顾问和专家当面畅所欲言、自由辩论。

在意大利农民家里的墙壁上可以看到刻着大写字母的传说：“墨索里尼永远正确。”但是假如意大利驻外大使、意大利参谋部、意大利财政部长都把那句传说信以为真的话，那人们只好说，愿上帝保佑墨索里尼，保佑意大利，保佑埃塞俄比亚的新国王吧。

因为在某个时刻，即使在极权主义国家里，促使对立意见进行争论的舆论自由应该存在，这是必不可少的。随着时间推移，专制体制下舆论自由越来越不容易了，内部对立遭到杜绝而赞成大家思想感情一致，批评讨论也随之消失。所以暴君们——拿破仑一世和拿破仑三世早期取得成功，后来却犯下无可补救的错误。由于偏听唯命是从的人——其他人处以流放或关入集中营，或是遭到恐吓——暴君便切断了自己了解真相的言路，而任何人都无法脱离真相。

我们对独裁统治进行思考时，对上述一切都非常清楚。但是当我们通过对比试图想想我们自己的制度时，我们头脑中会出现什么情景呢？那情景不就是人人可以站在临时演讲台上畅所欲言，如同吉卜林诗中描写的那样，每个人都坐在各自的星球上，把自己目睹的事物描绘成万物之主。或许吉卜林能够这么做，因为他是诗人。但是独居各自的星球的凡人就会产生幻觉，在各自的临时演讲台上慷慨陈词的市民则会一派胡言，混淆视听。

假如取代极权体制单向广播的民主方案是一排分开的临时演讲台，那么我认为这种取而代之的方案并不可行与合理，也没有人情味的吸引力。这毕竟是个错误的选择。

人人可以自由建立临时演讲台，可以自由租用一个大厅以便向愿意倾听的那些人阐述自己的意见，这并不真正表明自由已经在文明人中间得到发展。相反，只有在同一个大厅向同一批听众阐述不同的意见，这时才能说确立言论自由达到了它的根本目的。

因为，尽管说话的权利可能是自由的开端，然而倾听的必要性才使得这种权利变得重要。即使在俄罗斯和德国，一个人也可以站在旷野里倾吐心声。关键并不在于表达意见，在于争论中各种意见的交锋。愚者个个想说什么就说什么，没有人会去肖真留意。最聪明的人在撒哈拉大沙漠中发表真知灼见的话，不会产生任何效果。这是虚幻的自由。愚者被迫倾听智者意见而且向他们学习，智者被迫考虑到愚者并且予以指教，智者依靠听取其他前辈的判断而增长智慧，那时我们才懂得自由的实质。

这就是文明人必须珍惜自由的道理一它是一种有助于发现真理的手段。所以我们不可把自己的全部注意力集中于下述权利：人人可以租用自己的大厅、租借自己的广播电台、散发自己的小册子。这些权利是附带性的，尽管必须予以保护，但是只有作为附带性的、作为必须珍惜和培养的自由的实质的附属品才能予以保护。

因此，最好这样来设想言论自由：头脑中出现美国国会这么个场所的情景，这是对立观点得以陈述的汇集处，各种思想不仅可以表达而且可以争论；或是想象英国议会，自由发言的议员也被迫作答。我们可以设想，自由的真实状态存在于法庭那样的地方，见证人作证并受到盘问，双方律师在同一位法官和同一个陪审团面前展开唇枪舌剑。

我们可以设想，自由存在于一个论坛上，发言者必须回答问题；存在于科学家聚集的地方，数据、假设和结论都交给行家去评判；自由还存在于声誉好的报刊上，它不仅刊登各种分歧的意见，而且还据此重新审视自家的看法。

从而舆论自由的实质不仅仅在于宽容本身，而在于宽容带来的争论；不在于观点的表述，而在于观点的对立。我们只要记住，在看待审査和制约不同传播媒体提供的见解上，大家的感受和行为大不相同，就容易理解什么是自由的实质了。我们继而发现，只要传媒使辩论的观点难以交锋，我们就是被迫走向审査和制约的。

比如说，造谣活动，流言蜚语四处传播，而你又无法迫使传谣者证实他们的谎言，这样就使我们忍无可忍。所以当匿名徘谤者终于被抓住曝光并受惩罚时，没有多少人不为之欢欣。在更高层次上有电影，它是传播思想最有力的载体，但也是无法进行辩论的载体。影片相互之间无法做出有力的回答；在所有自由国度里，电影都需经过某些审査。如果制片人未能认识其局限性以免引起政治风波，那么审迕的力度还会增大。接下来还有广播电台，辩论在此难以进行，因为难以保证在回答发言者的问题时听众仍是同一批人。势必要对广播有所制约。

谈到报界，辩论的机会很多，所以不满情绪不可能发展到正常情况下报刊也要接受管制的地步。但是当报纸滥用权力，伤害没有回答手段的人时，制约报界的想法就出现了。来到国会，我们发现众议院议员众多，充分辩论行不通。于是便有一些限制规定。然而，在参议院，有条件充分辩论，所以言论几乎绝对自由。

这就向我们表明，维护和发展舆论自由不仅仅是坚持抽象的法定权利的问题，而且还是一个组织安排充分的辩论的紧要问题。一旦我们紧紧抓住了中心原则，便可得出许多实用的结论。然后我们会意识到，捍卫舆论自由主要在于为不同观点的充分交流提供良好的机会，其次也在于对那些革命者的自由加以制约，因为在辩论不适合其目的时，他们不会，也不愿允许或者维持辩论。

我们必须坚持，自由演讲仅仅是实行言论自由的开始；它不是目的，而是达到目的的手段。其目的是找到真理。公民自由最好的理由不在于表达自己乃是每个人的一个权利，而在于对每个意见的检验乃是每个人的需要。因为经验告诉我们，只有当言论自由能迫使我们进行辩论的时候，我们的开国元勋们播下的种子才算结出果实。当人们明白了这个道理时，他们珍惜自由才不会仅仅是因为它为我们的意见提供了一个自由表达的窗口，而是因为它是纠正错误意见的最为可靠的方法。

苏格拉底曾经说过，没有经过检验的生活不是人类该有的生活。自由的好处以及我们可以对其坚信不疑的最好的根据，就在于它容忍错误是为了服务于真理。当人们不得不面对他们的反对者，倾听并了解他们的意见，而且修正自己的观点的时候，到那时，他们才不再是幼稚的儿童或野蛮人，而开始像文明人那样生活。由于必须审视自己的观点，人们才可能发表自己的观。点，只有到了这一步自由才成为现实。

如此长篇大论一番的唯一理由是，如果要维护民主，我们就必须领会它的原则。区别民主和其他统治形式的原则是：在民主国家里，容许反对意见不仅是宪法规定的，而且必须予以维护，因为客观上它是不可缺少的。

没有有效的反对力量，民主制度是无法运作的。因为，在进行通过人民的认可而不是依靠强制手段治理一国人民的伟大试验中，掌权的一方拥有多数支持是不够的，同样必须做到的是，这一方还永远不可激怒少数人。这意味着，他们必须倾听少数人的意见，并且对他们的批评意见不能无动于衷，而要釆取行动，做出必要的反应。这就意味着，它的措施必须把少数人的反对意见考虑在内，而且在实行措施的时候，它必须牢牢记住，那少数有可能会变成多数。

反对派是不可或缺的。一个好政治家，就和其他任何明白事理的人一样，永远会从他的反对者那里学到比从他最热心的支持者那里更多的东西。因为除非他的反对者给他指出危险所在，他的支持者们肯定会把他推进灾难之中。所以，如果他聪明的话，他就会常常祈祷能从朋友的影响中解放出来，因为他们会毁了他。但是，虽然这会使他痛苦，他同时还应该希望他永远不会落到没有反对派的地步；因为他们会使他始终不离开理智和明智的道路。

一个国家的自由人民的民族团结依靠的是政治权利足够合理的平衡，这样辨治者们就不可能专制武断，而反对派也不至于被迫走向革命，变得不可调和。一旦这种平衡不再存在，民主也就完蛋了，因为除非一个国家所有的公民都在形势的压力下必须调和，除非他们觉得自己能够影响政策，而无人能够完全独霸，除非出于习惯和需要他们不得不礼尚往来，平等对待，否则自由是不可能得到维持的。

Key Words:

magnanimous [mæg'næniməs]

adj. 度量大的，宽大的，有雅量的，高尚的

propaganda [.prɔpə'gændə]

n. 宣传，宣传的内容

indispensable [.indis'pensəbl]

adj. 不可缺少的

confrontation [.kɔnfrʌn'teiʃən]

n. 对审，面对面，面对

presence ['prezns]

n. 出席，到场，存在

essence ['esns]

n. 本质，精髓，要素，香精

preservation [.prezə'veiʃən]

n. 保存

irreconcilable [i'rekənsailəbl]

adj. 不能和解的，不能协调的，矛盾的

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